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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to propose a potential organizational structure for 
effectively utilizing Information Operations (IO) within the Department of Defense 
(DOD).  This thesis is in response to a request for research from the vice commander of 
the 193 Special Operations Wing.  According to this individual, the FY 1999 Joint 
Warfighting Capabilities Assessment, IO panel cycle, highlighted various deficiencies 
ranging from inadequate manning and force structure, to ineffective planning and 
integration processes, to inadequate capabilities available to support CINC requirements.  
Currently no one federal agency or military department has total responsibility or 
authority to bring all the disparate, but dependent, IO functions/requirements together.  
As a result, funding, personnel resourcing, and control is fragmented to the detriment of 
the nation’s warfighting capabilities.   
As demonstrated by the above finding, the subject of IO has pervaded numerous 
warfighting commands, doctrinal documents, and future vision plans.  Despite this 
pervasion, there is no single agency within DOD that has the sole responsibility for 
providing or prosecuting information operations.  The thesis will answer the question:  
What is an effective organizational structure for providing information operations that 
produces the synergistic effects of centralization without reducing the gains achieved at 
unit levels by having a decentralized approach?  The answer to this question will provide 
an organizational model that may be applied to any individual service, or DOD as a 
whole, to provide an organized approach to IO.  The authors of this thesis do not contend 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This thesis explores the development of an organizational model for providing 
Information Operations (IO) related functions at either a unified or service level of 
command.  The main emphasis consists of justifying the reason for having the discussion, 
deriving a generic organizational structure, demonstrating the feasibility of 
implementation, and finally demonstrating the potential gains of implementation. 
First, the justification for even exploring this issue is emphasized.  One 
explanation for scrutinizing the organization of IO is centered around three elements: 1) 
promotion of unity of command, 2) elimination of redundancy or unity of effort, and 3) 
providing synergism between diverse functional areas, i.e., Intelligence, PSYOPS, PA, 
Communications, etc.   
After highlighting the reasons to inspect the organization of IO, we offered a case 
study analysis concerning the causes of centralization in DOD.  The cases used were: 1) 
formation of the USAF as a separate service, 2) establishment of USSOCOM, 3) creation 
of NORTHCOM following 9/11, and 4) organization of the Air Corps following World 
War I.  These cases are matched against the possibility of a separate IO command.  
Several variables that add validity to IO centralization as well as other cases studied 
include: 1) no clear chain of command, 2) possible failure in conflict, and 3) external 
threat.   
Since IO organization is worth examining and the organizational centralization of 
IO is potentially warranted in DOD, we developed a generic organizational structure by 
using an existing paradigm, i.e., USSOCOM.  We showed how this organization would 
support both peace time and war time operations, how it can provide for all functional 
areas related to IO, and how it conducts day-to-day functions using a matrix structure 
throughout an existing force.   
Using this generic organizational structure, we showed the application of this 
model at a unified level of command.  This step in development demonstrates the 
feasibility of implementing an organizational model.  It also shows how using existing 
organizations in DOD, i.e., JWAC, USACAPOC, etc., reduces fiscal constraints.   
 xvi
In the last phase of this organizational model development, we modeled a subset 
of the generic model using VITE© software (a form of organizational modeling 
software).  Specifically, we modeled an IO cell tasked with developing an IO plan for a 
JTF commander.  Overall, this demonstrates a possible IO model’s synergistic effects by 
simulating how PSYOPS, CA, PA, Intelligence and Communications can join forces.  
Two scenarios are used: 1) where individuals have never worked together before and 2) 
where individuals have trained and worked together as part of an IO command.  The 
results of this simulation showed that there was a minimum 50 percent improvement in 
task accomplishment under an IO command environment.   
In conclusion, even though a separate IO command may not be the only way, it 
can promote the achievement of Information Superiority that is part of JV 2010, 2020, 

































The purpose of this thesis is to propose a potential organizational structure for 
effectively utilizing Information Operations (IO) within the Department of Defense 
(DOD).  This thesis is in response to a request for research from the vice commander of 
the 193 Special Operations Wing.  According to this individual, the FY 1999 Joint 
Warfighting Capabilities Assessment, IO panel cycle, highlighted various deficiencies 
ranging from inadequate manning and force structure, to ineffective planning and 
integration processes, to inadequate capabilities available to support CINC requirements.  
Currently no one federal agency or military department has total responsibility or 
authority to bring all the disparate, but dependent, IO functions/requirements together.  
As a result, funding, personnel resourcing, and control is fragmented to the detriment of 
the nation’s warfighting capabilities.   
As demonstrated by the above finding, the subject of IO has pervaded numerous 
warfighting commands, doctrinal documents, and future vision plans.  Despite this 
pervasion, there is no single agency within DOD that has the sole responsibility for 
providing or prosecuting information operations.  The thesis will answer the question:  
What is an effective organizational structure for providing information operations that 
produces the synergistic effects of centralization without reducing the gains achieved at 
unit levels by having a decentralized approach?  The answer to this question will provide 
an organizational model that may be applied to any individual service, or DOD as a 
whole, to provide an organized approach to IO.  The authors of this thesis do not contend 
that this model will be the only way to organize for IO, only one way to organize for IO. 
B. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis will utilize several approaches to develop its organizational model.  
Several approaches are utilized due to the complexity of the question poised by this 
thesis. 
There will first be a general discussion of the state of IO in today’s military.  The 
purpose of this discussion is to provide some justification for even exploring the creation 
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of an organizational model for IO.  In short, it is intended to preempt the naysayers who 
will claim there is no reason for even discussing the topic. 
Following this is the presentation of a generic organizational model for providing 
IO.  The model is derived by examining current military organizations, i.e., the existing 
unified commands and major commands in the separate services.  As well, the 
requirements for IO as set forth in Joint Pub 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information 
Operations, are used.  The model is intended be a template that can be applied at either 
the unified or individual service level. 
After describing the generic model, the feasibility of implementing the model is 
demonstrated by applying the model at the unified command level to create the nominal 
organization of the United States Information Operations Command (USIOC).  In order 
to demonstrate real-world feasibility, existing organizations are applied to the generic 
model. 
Finally, to demonstrate the potential gains of implementing the model, a portion 
of the organization is modeled using the organizational modeling software Vite©.  The 
goal of this modeling effort is to determine if there are any gains to be realized by having 
personnel of differing fields of expertise yet are members of the same organization work 
together.  The contention is that by being in a single organization, a culture of knowledge 
will exist that allows individual members to have a higher understanding of their peer’s 
particular field of expertise.  The hope is that this higher understanding will result in 
improvements in working on a collaborative project that involves numerous diverse areas 
of expertise, i.e., an IO plan. 
In short, the methodology used consists of justifying the reason for having the 
discussion, deriving a generic organizational structure, demonstrating the feasibility of 
implementation, and finally demonstrating the potential gains of implementation. 
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II. WHY AN ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE? 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In the past, the world leisurely strolled to the front door, coffee in hand, to get the 
morning newspaper.  However, today, the world wakes up, rolls over, and powers-up the 
personal computer.  The World Wide Web has become the world’s information source 24 
hours a day, 7 days a week.  The information revolution must be reckoned with as it 
grows exponentially.  This wealth and speed of information can be exploited as an 
advantage during modern warfare.   
…as the US defense community debates the role of information in 
warfare, new information-age threats and enemies are emerging. States, 
even individuals, without traditional sources of military power, can 
threaten US global military leadership. To confront this new potential, the 
US armed forces must understand information power and how to organize 
for victory in joint warfighting. (Gortler, 1995) 
 
To form a better, more complete understanding of Information Operations (IO) 
with regards to modern warfare, we must understand the problems with the U.S. 
military’s current approach to IO.  Once these problems are recognized, the question 
becomes what corrective actions should be taken?  These corrective actions may 
stimulate organizational changes, such as the creation of a new IO command.  In this 
chapter, I will explore the current problems that exist within the IO framework of DOD.  
I will specifically address problems associated with some basic principles of war that 
have proven reliable throughout military history.  Once these problems are evident, I will 
offer some possible solutions for change to include an organizational approach that can 
be used to alleviate the problems and some goals that may be appropriate to “jump start” 
an organizational change for IO. 
B. PROBLEMS 
Although Desert Storm may have not been the first true “information war,” it 
raised the awareness of military strategists to a point where IO can be considered the key 
to victory in future military conflicts.   
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Growing evidence suggests that new military organizations and far 
more capable means and methods of warfare will supersede the military 
systems, operations, organizations, and force structures that dominated the 
Cold War. To maintain its lead in the Information Age, the US must truly 
revolutionize its military affairs. Piecemeal infusion of information-age 
technologies is insufficient. Such infusions certainly provided an 
overwhelming edge to the US during the Gulf War, but now the genie is 
out of the bottle. Others, nations and individuals, are pursuing information 
power. To revolutionize military operations, the US must radically change 
its organizational, operational, and doctrinal approaches. If the US military 
does this methodically, it will emerge from the revolution prepared to 
confront the formidable information-age threats posed by an expanded 
battlespace and non-traditional classes of warriors. (Gortler, 1995) 
 
Commanders dating back to Sun Tzu have realized the importance of information 
superiority when faced with opposing forces.  The publication of the first joint IO 
doctrine (Joint Pub 3-13) in October 1998 also demonstrates this recognition and the need 
for a fundamental set of guidelines in the area of IO.  In relation to future conflict, what 
are the problems with the U.S. military’s current approach to understanding the 
applications of IO?  To begin, we should look at the U.S. military’s apparent departure 
from one of the basic principles of war relative to IO. 
One of the most fundamental principles of war described by the world-renowned 
war theorist, Karl von Clausewitz, is unity of command.  Unity of command focuses on 
capabilities in support of the main objective under the leadership of one commander. 
Unity simply recognizes the fact that a committee is not best suited 
to making rapid decisions; that a single representative from a group, is 
better able to communicate with external organizations; and a clear leader 
is good for morale. Too many bosses breed confusion, office politics 
severely hampers productivity. Unity defines who is accountable for what. 
Unity of Command is why the executive branch is in charge of the 
military, there are 100s of members of Congress, there is only one 
Commander-in-Chief (Morgan, 2000). 
 
In effect, the above statement describes centralization, as well; “when all the 
power for decision making rests at a single point in the organization-ultimately in the 
hands of one person-we shall call the structure centralized” (Mintzberg, 1993, p.95).  
Joint Pub 3-13 establishes a planning and coordinating IO cell to support the Joint Force 
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Commanders.  However, a problem arises because there is no single entity responsible 
for IO as is the case with other J-n roles, such as J-6 (Communications) or J-3 
(Operations).  The IO cell reports to operations, but does not include intelligence or 
communication efforts directly, which are merely coordination related.   
The current arrangement on the Joint Staff presents some unique 
challenges as no one is actually in charge.  J-3 and J-6 are too busy to 
dedicate the constant attention this area requires and day-to-day 
responsibility for IO on the Joint Staff is delegated.  A need exists for 
direct flag officer sponsorship to orchestrate joint IO policy and doctrine 
development, conduct operational planning, and establish requirements. 
(Fredericks, 1997) 
This point is also emphasized when one looks at the IO structure of the U.S. Air Force.  
Current Air Force (AF) structure has three major players in the IO arena: the Air 
Intelligence Agency (AIA), the Air Force Communication Agency (AFCA), and the 
Chief Information Officer (CIO).  First, and probably foremost, is AIA whose mission, in 
part, is to “provide full-spectrum information operations products, applications, services 
and resources to Air Force major commands” (Air Intelligence, 2000).  AIA was 
previously a Field Operating Agency of the Air Staff, but as of February 1, 2001, the 
organization was rolled into the Air Combat Command (ACC).  The AFCA has a similar 
mission in part, where it is tasked with “helping the Air Force maintain information 
superiority by ensuring that communications and information systems used by the war 
fighters are integrated and interoperable” (Air Force, 2000).  While the AFCA has no 
structural link to AIA other than being in the AF, it does report to the deputy CIO.  The 
CIO’s vision, similar to a mission, is “an Air Force that works better and costs less 
through the smart use of information” (Visions, 2000).  In short, the CIO and AFCA are 
players within the communications functional community, whereas AIA is owned and 
predominately run by the intelligence community.  As stated before, other than all being 
in the AF, there is no structural organization that ties all parties together, and therein lies 
a major portion of the problem.   
It seems there will be a need for some decentralization when and if an IO 
command is established, because of its need “to respond quickly to local conditions” and 
because it cannot possibly make all its decisions “at one center” within the rapidly 
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changing information environment (Mintzberg, p.96).  The U.S. military can obtain the 
benefits of centralization as well as decentralization.  Each approach is not a fixed 
solution, since they can and do operate on a continuous scale.  However, there needs to 
be a means to achieve overall coordination and direction that a centralized structure may 
be able to provide.   
Up to this point, DOD IO activities can be characterized as highly decentralized 
with no single person “in charge” which leads to another dilemma in a key element of 
war - objective.  According to FM 100-5, every military endeavor should be directed 
towards a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective (1994).  Although DOD has 
fashioned various, all-encompassing definitions for IO and what it includes, there is no 
instrument for developing, integrating, and maintaining strategic IO initiatives.  Currently 
DOD’s answer to IO command and control is spread throughout agencies, unified 
commands, JTF organizations and individual services.  Consequentially, the overall 
“belly button” for IO seems to lie with the SECDEF’s Chief Information Officer (CIO).  
Although the DOD CIO is “responsible for providing capabilities that enable the military 
forces of the United States to generate, use and share information necessary to survive 
and succeed on every mission” (ASD C3I, 2001), he has not defined or explained IO in 
unambiguous terms.  This state in IO affairs has not prompted the establishment of a 
concise objective, which the “leader in charge” should provide.  Also, without a defined 
objective, DOD tends to reiterate work that has already been accomplished or wastefully 
spend dollars on systems or methods already being utilized.   
The above-mentioned decentralized approach brings us to the last problem 
associated with the military’s approach to understanding IO.  In operation, this distributed 
scheme and lack of command within the defense community is causing a problem with 
the “economy of force” principle of war.  While every DOD organization is vying for the 
prestige of becoming the “go to” expert in IO, duplication of effort is rampant, which can 
lead to unnecessary dispersal of scarce funds needed in all areas of information warfare.  
Instead of minimizing its endeavors concerning IO matters, each service, command or 
organization is exuding tremendous effort.  Individual commands, branches of service 
and units are allowed flexibility to employ IO in manners best suited to their unique 
requirements.  The DOD CIO structure in place offers little guidance to capitalize on 
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individual advances in IO such that there is corporate advancement in the area of IO.  
Each service has formed its own IO strategy to outline direction, doctrine and objectives 
within the IO realm and lack any coordinating mechanisms to learn from each other.  
While this decentralized approach has allowed organizational learning that more fully 
explores an unknown arena, it also has allowed the services to engage in independent 
corporate advancement, which may not be to the benefit of the overall IO “jointness” of 
the defense department.  The notion of corporate advancement, laying claim to new 
concepts in order to gain additional funds, recognition and prestige is even evident within 
the individual services.   
As an example, both the Navy and the Army conducted exercises using cutting 
edge technology to demonstrate the capability to enhance the operations of conventional 
forces with technology.  In both exercises similar, yet different, technology was used 
(Adams, J., p. 119).  Basically, two separate services traveled down two different paths to 
get to the same location, and both paths were toll roads.  Similar to this case, both the Air 
Force Information Warfare Center and the Fleet Information Warfare Center use systems 
to monitor the network in order to detect intrusions.  While both organizations basically 
fulfill the same purpose and use systems to achieve the same goal, the systems are 
different (Adams, J., p. 210).   This means both organizations pay for the acquisition and 
maintenance of two different systems that fulfill the same purpose.   
The lack of coordination between computer network defense (CND) and 
computer network attack (CNA) is an additional difficulty of the current decentralized 
approach to IO that highlights lack of unity and lack of objective.  In part, this is due to 
the way IO currently is integrated throughout the existing force.  Revisiting the Air Force 
structure presented above highlights a good example of this lack of integration.  As of 
February 2001, the AIA has been swallowed-up by ACC.  The justification given for this 
merger was a desire to recognize the role of IO as a war-fighting weapon and bring it into 
a similar structure as other weapon systems (Air Intelligence, 2000).  This approach is not 
rational when compared with other Air Force organization functions.  For instance, ACC 
originally was intended to be the single source for all air combat weapon systems and 
associated support and logistic elements.  Similarly, Air Mobility Command (AMC) is 
the single source for airlift weapon systems.  From a functional point of view, Air Force 
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Special Operations Command (AFSOC) and Air Force Material Command (AFMC) exist 
for the specialties of special operations and acquisition respectively.  Therefore, the 
justification for putting AIA under ACC so that it is treated like other weapon systems is 
inconsistent when one takes a look at the overall AF structure.  In this instance, the AF 
lacks a clear objective and has put a major provider and conductor of IO under a 
command that focuses primarily on the dropping of bombs.  This is the same as saying IO 
only has application within actual warfare and nothing to do with the day-to-day 
operations of the AF.  Not only does this not match the AF application of structure and 
organization, it also could have serious impact on other facets of AF missions other than 
dropping bombs, such as defense.  The DOD approach to defensive and offensive IO also 
resembles a suspect unity of command and lack of discerning objective.  Joint Task Force 
Computer Network Operations (JTF-CNO) is responsible for clarifying goals for CND 
and CNA, however, it is subject to the authority and direction of USCINCSPACE.  
Although JTF-CNO states it operates in conjunction with unified commands, services and 
DOD agencies (SPACECOM, 2001), the ultimate responsibility lies in the hands of 
USCINCSPACE.  Even though defensive and offensive IO are unified under a single 
commander, other unified commands are not subject to its authority. This creates an 
overall disjointed DOD approach to CNA and CND where integration and development 
occurs in separate commands.  IO defense and offense requires a mutual effort from a 
clearly stated objective not an assumed coordinated effort where the responsible authority 
is in a separate command.  Why is this part of IO so essential? 
Attacks on information systems are already a fact of life in the 
Information Age…Given our present vulnerabilities as a Nation, a well 
planned, coordinated IW attack could have "Strategic" consequences. 
Such an attack or the threat of such an attack, could thwart our foreign 
policy objectives, degrade military performance, result in significant 
economic loss, and perhaps even undermine the confidence of our citizens 
in the Government's ability to protect its citizens and interests. While no 
"smoking keyboard" has been found to validate such a threat, the very 
existence of the means to carry out such an attack, when coupled with the 
myriad of motives and the opportunities that exist, results in our present 
state of vulnerability. These circumstances have created a situation that 
calls for prudent defensive actions to be taken in the public interest. We 
need to be proactive rather than be forced to react after an Information 
Age "Pearl Harbor." Moreover, a successful strategic attack would point 
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the way and encourage others to plan similar attacks. Hence, we need to 
go on the offense with a vigorous defense. (Alberts, 1996) 
 
The point is that the military must merge its efforts in application of information attacks 
and information defense.  The functional unified command capable of carrying out this 
task is currently buried in SPACECOM under JTF-CNO that does not operate through an 
official chain of command. 
C. SOLUTIONS FOR CHANGE  
Now that we have seen the problems associated with current IO organization: 1) 
lack in unity of command/no one in charge 2) no clear objective and 3) lack in economy 
of force/duplication of effort, what solutions can be utilized to bring about appropriate 
changes in the U.S. military to prevent existing difficulties?  The armed forces have 
attempted to integrate IO into an existing structure.  This has occurred at the same time 
the military states it is in a “Revolution in Military Affairs” due to technology that is a 
major force enhancer of IO.  In order to better facilitate this revolution, we need to 
consolidate our efforts in approaching IO.  Creating a focal point for direction and 
coordination coupled with the formation of revised policy and formal doctrine is an 
excellent starting point in the U.S. military’s approach to IO.  This focal point may be a 
separate IO command.  Basically, the military has tried to force IO into an existing 
structure as opposed to recognizing IO as a totally new concept and adapting to it in a 
revolutionary manner.  If we develop an IO command, the U.S. military not only follows 
traditional force structuring, it also has the ability to bring IO services to all ends of the 
spectrum of application.  By having all information experts, from users, gatherers, and 
maintainers, “under one roof”, the military increases its potential for fully exploiting all 
the prospective advantages that exist within IO.  The current structure has this expertise 
spread out through unrelated areas and treats IO as a weapon only and not as something 
that has a benefit to how we do business on a day-to-day basis.  If we create a new IO 
command, we will be able to reduce the redundancy of effort and the expenditure of 
needed funds seen throughout DOD from an IO perspective.  Also, the military will be 
able to combine its efforts in the CND and CNA to formulate a more synergistic strategy 
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of application.   However, before we can combat these problems, one option would be to 
create a centralized command organization.   
D. ORGANIZATIONAL APPROACH 
If DOD pursues the creation of a separate IO command, what type of 
organizational approach should the U.S. military employ to promote the most effective 
solution?  Before an organization can be considered for handling IO, a thorough 
understanding of the elements of information operations must be understood.  At first, the 
military needs to use the centralized approach it has applied with every major command 
that emphasizes the strategic apex.  The strategic apex of an organization envisioned by 
Mintzberg plays the most important part in formulation of strategy (1993, p. 14).  This 
type of organization is also one with which the military is most familiar.   
This initial beginning will allow the military a chance to establish a central point 
to formulate clear, concise and effective policy and strategy.  There has to be emphasis 
on definition and applicability of IO.  Direct supervision of all major IO players will 
provide direction and coordination that will allow the new command to take the next step.  
Once the strategy is formulated, the innovative command can begin its predictable shift to 
the standardization of work as seen in a machine bureaucracy.   
As mentioned earlier, the centralized structure of an emerging IO command does 
not necessarily have to forfeit the potential paybacks of decentralization.  As Mintzberg 
(1993, p. 98) states, “centralization and decentralization should not be treated as 
absolutes, but rather as two ends of a continuum.”  There will be a need for some 
selective decentralization, “the power over different kinds of decisions rests in different 
places in the organization” (1993, p. 100), once the new IO command has formulated 
clear guidance, determined its objectives, and is up and running.  Within the fast-paced 
changes of the information environment, there will be a requirement to shift some power 
to the analysts, support specialists and operators that Mintzberg describes as “ horizontal 
decentralization” (1993, p. 105).  Overall, with respect to the military’s approach to IO, 
we can reap the benefits of both decentralization and centralization.  
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The Marine Corps’ Combat Development Command has developed an extremely 
comprehensive definition of the elements of IO (Marine Corps CDC, 1998).  The 
elements of IO are depicted in Figure 1 below. 
Information
Operations






























Figure 1. Elements of Marine Corps Information Operations(From: Marine 
Corps) 
As with any aspect of military power, there are both the offensive and defensive 
realms.  As well, both realms are complementary in that offensive actions can neutralize 
the enemy’s ability to attack information systems and thus defend these information 
systems.  Similarly, defensive capabilities ensure the continual ability to launch attacks.  
Consequently, neither can be conducted in a vacuum.  Both must be aware of the actions 
of the other.  The elements of defensive IO are the protection of the information 
12 
environment, the ability to detect an attack, the ability to reconstitute after an attack, and 
finally the ability to respond to an attack.  These aspects are typically linked with 
information warfare and electronic warfare; however, both of these types of warfare are 
merely subsets of IO. 
A complete definition of IO should include any aspect of military operations that 
involves elements affecting the decision making process with the exception of the 
application of direct physical force.  In that regard, public affairs, civil affairs, 
psychological operations, and information gathering, i.e., intelligence and 
reconnaissance, are all elements of IO.  Information gathering supports both the 
successful and accurate application of physical force and the application of offensive and 
defensive IO.  Public affairs, civil affairs, and psychological operations are IO tools 
necessary for shaping and sculpting the perception of adversaries and allies alike.  Thus, 
these three tools are referred to as perception management tools (Alexander, 1999, p. 
111). 
Having fleshed out the elements of IO, it is possible to then define IO.  IO is the 
application of tools, methods, or procedures to affect the decision making process of an 
adversary force while at the same time defending against the ability to affect one’s own 
decision making process.  The basis of any decision is information.  Therefore, inherent 
within IO is the gathering and disseminating of information necessary for the decision 
making process.   
The challenge is how to integrate IO within the existing military force in such a 
manner that allows the ability to utilize IO in daily operations and the ability to capture a 
corporate synergy from this utilization.  The answer to this challenge may be to allocate 
IO resources under a single command structure that provides IO services to a corporate 
customer base in such a manner as to not impair the customer’s flexibility in its use, yet 
allow the customer to have a stronger tool that is based on a corporate knowledge.  
E. GOALS OF A NEW IO COMMAND 
One of the first goals of a new IO command is establishing a focal point for 
overall direction, coordination, integration and implementation within the IO realm. The 
current decentralized, ad hoc approach does not allow the effective formation of 
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applicable doctrine or strategy that is desperately needed to begin addressing IO in the 
rapidly changing “information age” context.  A single entity is needed to bring all facets 
together to enhance the overall approach to information dominance.  Incorporating all IO 
players (experts, users, gatherers, and maintainers) under a single command will allow 
the military to exploit all possible advantages of IO and share crucial information 
essential to an all-encompassing strategy.  As the U.S. military struggles to develop IO 
doctrine in a dispersed way, the enemy continues to improve their ability to wreak havoc 
in the information domain.  Instead of debating IO across the respective DOD spectrum, 
the U.S. military needs to narrow the debate with a responsible authority as its moderator 
and as its initiator to begin applying what we know in an integrated way.  The military 
can achieve a solution that is greater than the sum of its parts, but only if it is willing to 
rethink the manner in which it currently approaches this “revolution”.  Central control 
will provide a priceless beginning that will enable the military to establish the course it 
desperately needs.   
Once the U.S. military has reached consensus in an overall IO strategy, then it can 
begin using some selective decentralization that Mintzberg proposes.  The military can 
still maintain central monitoring for an appropriate response and at the same time 
delegate responsibility at various levels, but oversight and IO response capability will 
ultimately lie in the hands of the IO CINC.    
From the outset, an additional goal will be evident in the formation of an IO 
command. As mentioned earlier, a new command will reduce redundancy and duplication 
of effort with respect to IO.  The immediate effects of simply integrating CNA and CND 
will go a long way in reducing co-existing efforts.  We can observe from the examples 
above how completely separate methodology can arrive at the same conclusions, but not 
without double the hard work and fiscal expenditures.  Our examples cross military 
service department lines, however, the same efforts are being expended within each 
branch of service.  An IO command will reduce this redundancy from its very inception 
by centralizing the IO efforts under one roof.  The potential cost of centralizing IO is in 
stifling creativity by having a consolidated organization exploring a new field of study as 
opposed to having four organizations studying this field.  However, this cost can be 
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greatly minimized by both soliciting input and having the consolidated organization 
provide IO support to the other four.   
Another goal of the new IO command exists where the “rubber meets the road.”  
With regards to the tactical level of operations, individual units should maintain an 
information operations capability as necessary to complement the overall IO strategy.  
Marek (2000) sums this point up best when he states,   
As in any military endeavor, it is imperative that all operations at 
the tactical level support the tactical objectives.  These tactical objectives 
should support the operational strategy, which should achieve the 
operational objectives.  In turn, these should support the theater strategy, 
which should achieve the military strategic objectives.  While tactical 
operations and objectives may differ markedly from one military unit to 
the next, they should all support the attainment of the military strategic 
objectives.  In this respect, information warfare is no different from any 
other form of war-it, too, should seek congruence from the tactical to the 
strategic level of war. (Marek, 2000) 
 
When the new IO command develops its clear-cut objectives for an overall IO strategy, it 
will be each unit’s responsibility to analyze that strategy and build its own tactical 
objectives that expand on the new IO strategy.  The same processes used at the IO 
command level will also be seen at the tactical level.  How important is the tactical level 
goal of IO?  According to the Army Field Manual 100-6, it is extremely important, 
Information dominance is a temporary tactical condition 
achievable through a deliberate process. It entails the construction and 
protection of the information environment, collection of intelligence and 
relevant information, processing and dissemination of such information, 
and focused attack against both the enemy's C2 and his eyes and ears. 
Information dominance facilitates superiority in battlefield visualization at 
a specific time and place, creating a window of opportunity that is fleeting 
at best. The commander must seize the opportunity to gain the advantage 
through effective battle command. (1996) 
 
In preparation for the use of such tactical level IO operations, another goal of the 
new IO command will ultimately surface.  In order for the U.S. military to effectively 
utilize IO, it should organize and train its forces by efficiently integrating IO into military 
exercises.  DODD S-3600.1 makes this clear, 
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Sufficient training, including realistic exercises that simulate 
peacetime and wartime stresses, shall be conducted to ensure that 
commanders of US Armed Forces are well-informed about trade-offs 
among affecting, exploiting, and destroying adversary information 
systems, as well as the varying capabilities and vulnerabilities of DOD 
information systems. (1998, as cited in Joint Pub 3-13) 
 
Joint Pub 3-13 also emphasizes that exercises should incorporate IO training from an 
organizational and individual aspect.  It should be clearly put together within the entire 
process from planning to execution.   
Much of the problem in making headway in the area of information defense lies in 
the fact there is no “smoking gun” (Adams, J., p. 181).  This inconceivable train of 
thought must be turned around if America is to win the wars of the future.  It is only a 
matter of time before the hacker community rises above the military horizon and poses a 
credible and serious threat to national security.  The way to convince the doubters is 
through exercises such as Eligible Receiver (Adams, J., p. 187).  In this exercise, 
opposing information warfare forces were able to harmfully modify the logistics system 
used by warplanners to plan and execute war.  Such exercises must be implemented 
within our modern war games.  For example, when a major exercise such as Blue Flag, 
the major air-to-air combat exercise held by the Air Force, is being run, an opposition 
force should be established to wage information warfare.  During Eligible Receiver, the 
opposition force was able to modify logistic systems so that headlamps were delivered 
instead of missiles (Adams, J., p. 187).  If this were to happen during Blue Flag, surely 
someone would pay attention.  By integrating classified methods of information attack 
into modern war games, the government can begin to prepare the defense needed to 
counter attacks against critical systems.  As well, the emphasis needed for information 
operations can be gained by demonstrating that a relatively non-lethal force can be used 
for dire circumstances. 
F. CONCLUSION 
The U.S. prides itself in being at the “Tip of the Spear” when it comes to 
information technology.  Even one infamous vice president falsely claimed to have 
invented the Internet, hence reminding the public how important and prestigious it is to 
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be at the very top of this technological game in the U.S.  With the global proliferation of 
information comes uncertain consequences that can be catastrophic in relation to future 
military conflict.  From a military perspective, the importance of Information Operations 
(IO) in terms of protecting vital national interests cannot be overstated.  The U.S. must 
maintain its lead in information technology and systems.   
The U.S. military’s approach to organizing IO is in direct confrontation with three 
of the basic principles of war that have been historically successful.  Specific examples 
have been applied to underline this state of affairs.  Due to the rapidly changing 
information environment and previously addressed problems, one solution to DOD’s 
dilemma would be to provide an IO focal point for coordination and direction.  It may 
benefit the military to merge its IO expertise and exploit its “direct supervision” approach 
it has successfully applied with every major command.  Although DOD is currently 
attempting to use a nontraditional organizational approach by placing IO within an 
existing structure, it may be appropriate at this time of “Revolution in Military Affairs” to 
fallback on its historical success with centralized organizational structures.  In the past, 
DOD has stimulated substantial organizational change when it recognized a 
groundbreaking military concept, thus maintaining its military dominance.  If we are 
going to maintain our information dominance, we must be willing to take the necessary 
action to move forward.  Attempts to find the “smoking gun” in IO may only lead to 
further delays in establishing a feasible strategy and leave the U.S. unprepared to preempt 
or counter our information adversaries.  When DOD experienced times where the future 
of warfare was in question, it applied innovative approaches to traditional military 
structure that promoted unhampered national security.  Some cases involved in this 
recognition and inevitable transformation will be discussed in the next chapter.   
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III. WHAT CAUSES ORGANIZATIONAL CENTRALIZATION IN 
DOD? 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Now that the some reasons why DOD may require an organizational modification 
with regards to IO have been clarified, understanding what causes organizational 
centralization in DOD will be beneficial.  Using case study research methodology, we 
can explore possible answers to the title question.  This chapter will not provide an in 
depth analysis of this issue, but an external overview that provides adequate evidence to 
support the application of a theory that promotes DOD organizational centralization of 
information operations.  By analyzing several historical cases, this research offers 
evidence concerning why creating a separate information operations organization may be 
appropriate at this time.   
In the context of this study, organizational centralization is a change in any DOD 
organization where that organization becomes its own centralized, separate command.  A 
centralized military organization is important, because it is critical to its effective 
operation within the current structure of DOD and to carrying out its desired goals.  
Without a centralized organization any military force can become overwhelmed by 
countless goals, objectives and strategic concepts that can encourage the failure of that 
organization over time.  Some nations no longer exist today due to inadequate military 
organization.  Effective military organization is critical to the defense of a country against 
its enemies (national security).  National security applies across the spectrum; in other 
words it is crucial to all nations who want to maintain their independence in the world 
and keep their nation’s culture, norms, and values unscathed from outside influence.   In 
order to preserve their independence and success as a nation, they must be successful at 
any venture to include military conflict, akin to being a successful world power. 
B. SELECTED CASES AND WHY 
We will use the following cases in order to examine organizational centralization 
in DOD: INDENT 1), 2), 3), 4), TO .5 
1) Formation of the USAF as a separate service. 
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2) Establishment of USSOCOM. 
3) Current progress in creation of NORTHCOM following 9/11. 
4) Air Corps following World War I. 
 We use these specific cases because they are all classic cases where the U.S. 
experienced recognized and vital losses during military conflict.  In history, the U.S. has 
been active in the success and independence of its own values, norms and culture.  From 
the definitions of variables below, it is evident that each case contains some variation and 
aspect of the variables that should be included in this research.   
First, the U.S. military needed to reorganize following WWII because they 
wanted to remain a successful world power.  Although the U.S. did not experience 
substantial air power failure during WWII, its allies did.  This highlighted its need to 
adjust its military organization, improve its technological advantage within a changing 
external environment, and provide funds in pursuit of an air superiority advantage. 
Second, the U.S. military also needed to reorganize following several failures 
including the Iranian hostage rescue attempt and the Grenada operation.  Again an 
external threat was evident.  The rise of a new kind of war doctrine promoting low 
intensity conflict increased this threat.  
Third, the most recent example of failure for the U.S. is 9/11.  This significant 
loss propelled DOD into action by organizing a new Unified Command-NORTHCOM.  
This case is unique because it occurred very rapidly relative to the other cases.  It is 
important to observe this case because the U.S. can make changes to organizational 
structure when needed.   
Lastly, the Air Corps case provided is a control case to make a plausibility probe 
into the other cases examined.  It provides a look at a case where the military did not 
experience recognized failure and assumed it did not have an external threat change that 
threatened its success as a nation.  It is used to strengthen the theory addressed by the 




C. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Organizational centralization can be the result of several variables.  The variables 
utilized in this research include: 1) recognized, possible failure in conflict, 2) no clear 
chain of command, 3) change in external threat, 4) innovative product champion, and 5) 
the inability to effectively apply military force.   
One cause of organizational centralization within DOD is a recognized, possible 
failure in conflict, which means for the purposes of this research, a large or unreasonable 
loss of lives that is publicly identified and spurs fundamental change in military doctrine.  
Failure forces a nation to take a close look at why it happened.  It seems this investigation 
is only natural given a world that puts so much emphasis on success and independence.  
If a nation is not successful in military conflict, they must answer why and attempt to 
correct the mistakes so it will not happen again to maintain their own separate culture.  
The resulting correction in doctrine normally gives birth to force structure and 
organization modification.  By itself, failure may not necessarily mean a nation will form 
a centralized military structure.  However, failure in concert with other variables does 
give rise to organizational centralization. 
One such factor that helps stimulate a centralized military configuration in 
combination with failure is the lack of an explicit chain of command.  For the purposes of 
this research, a clear chain of command is one that provides a command structure with an 
unambiguous decision-making process.  When a nation fails in conflict, it must explore 
why and adjust or fine-tune its approach to conflict to avoid future failures.  Its first step 
in this course of action is ascertaining “who is responsible” or “who is in charge”.  This 
cannot be truer in the U.S.  Our culture educates us from birth to go straight to the person 
in charge.  This kind of attitude already exudes a tendency to promote a search for the 
pinnacle of a centralized group.  The U.S. private and public sectors usually know exactly 
who the “belly-button” is and where the ultimate responsibility lies.  Therefore, in order 
to adjust any organizational makeup to prevent future failures, we normally start at the 
top and then work our way down.  The military’s answer to this kind of adjustment 
involves a centralized organizational structure. 
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Another cause of centralized military organization within DOD occurs from 
changes in the external threat.  In order to preserve national success and independence, as 
triumph in war accomplishes, nations must be prepared to thwart threats from external 
environment alterations.  In this research, external threat changes are advancement in 
technology and/or other nations’ actions that promote a superior military force.  This 
advancement creates fear of dwindling national success and independence in other 
nations.  From this fear, undue pressure arises for the nation without advancement to 
amend its methods to overcome external threats, which reduce that nation’s ability to 
uphold its success and independence.  These amendments in harmony with other 
variables create a need for centralized military organization.   
An innovative product champion has also prompted organizational centralization 
in DOD, in part.  In this research, a product champion is someone who has the ability to 
look into the future and promote a somewhat drastic change to existing military 
organization to ensure U.S. national security.  With today’s emphasis on military 
innovation, it seems we have reconciled that this is a prominent factor in the future of 
warfare.  However, before now, our innovative activists encountered insurmountable road 
blocks, where at times he had to be willing to sacrifice his career to make the appropriate 
changes needed.  This research shows that product champions were recognized in 
response to military failure and external threat to modify or sometimes revolutionize 
outdated thinking in order to uphold our national security. It seems the military is really 
serious in its pursuit of innovative thinking, but normally they wait until the environment 
is sufficient to support change. 
One other variable that will be discussed in this research is the inability to 
effectively apply military force.  Even though at times, this variable helps incite 
organizational centralization, but it does not occur in all cases.  Therefore, it is not 
defined or operationalized in this summary. 
In Table 1 below, the resulting independent variables for each case evaluated are 
summarized.  It illustrates, from the analysis of each case, the variables that were at work 
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Table 1. Independent Variables 
D. ANALYSIS—USAF 
Carl Builder’s account of the birth of military aviation and organization of the 
U.S. Air Force is very thorough (Builder, 1994).  His in-depth look at the history of the 
Air Force demonstrates the aspects of recognized failure, external threat and product 
champions which provoked the establishment of a centralized Air Force organization. 
Prior to WWII and following Pearl Harbor, the War Department underwent 
several changes that promoted centralization for many organizations.  This well-known 
disappointment along with the recognition of possible collapse of democratic nations 
helped prompt an overall look at the War Department’s ability to sustain national 
security.  The reorganization of the War Department in 1942 gave the Air Corps a degree 
of autonomy second only to independence.   
 Further recognition of the status of the air arm came in July 1943 
when the War Department stated its official position in Field Manual 100-
20, Command and Employment of Air Power: “Land power and air power 
are co-equal and interdependent; neither is an auxiliary to the other.” 
(Goldberg, 1957, p. 100) 
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External technological improvements all over the world produced by a rapidly paced 
industrial revolution fueled new theories of warfare.  Times were changing at an 
increased rate.  The speed of information and air travel drastically increased, thus 
external threats became evident, and a new kind of war ensued.  This new kind of war no 
longer existed in the realms of theory; it now staked its claim in reality.  Recognized 
possible failure coupled with an external threat promoted a centralization of DOD 
organizations to include a separate aviation organization.  
...military aviation had opened up a completely new and dominant 
dimension of warfare-not just an adjunct to surface warfare-which could 
produce quick and decisive results in war if exploited through offensive 
strikes directly at the critical sources of enemy power; but to do those 
things, military aviation must first be used to control the air and be 
centrally and independently controlled. (1994, p. 62)  
 
According to Builder, air power offered a unique ability to strike at the heart of the 
enemy (1994, p. 62).  Air power could obtain the primary objective in war—victory.  It 
could stop the enemy’s will to fight by turning the enemy’s population into a terrified, 
nonsupporting mass and destroy the enemy’s command centers and production 
capability.  “Air power wasn’t just a new means for waging war, it could be seen as the 
most effective means for getting directly to the central objective of war” (1994, p. 60).  
The War Department (DOD) recognized the future threat of military aviation.  Along 
with this threat, it realized that failures were not only possible, but absolute.   
Following WWI, various product champions arose to promote the theory of 
military air power, which at this time was paramount in the prosecution of a centralized 
aviation organization.  Although some of these air power prophets dated back to WWI, 
their ideas were carried forward to a time when external threat and recognized failure 
were more prevalent.  It is clear that the three most prominent air power theorists had 
consistent influence on each other.  
Giulio Douhet, Hugh Trenchard and Billy Mitchell were the first air power 
pioneers to address the organization of military aviation.  Although Douhet’s ideas were 
not all his own, he was the first to write them down and they were, “the most coherent, 
the most systematic and the most prophetic air power writings of the era” (1994, p. 50).  
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Douhet used graphic descriptions of air power’s use on civilians.  When air power was 
used on this “sustainer of war”, it would provide quick victory that would spare lives.  
His founding principle stated that, “to conquer the command of the air means victory; to 
be beaten in the air means defeat and acceptance of whatever terms the enemy may be 
pleased to impose” (1994, p. 60).  He added that, “in order to assure an adequate national 
defense, it is necessary—and sufficient—to be in a position in case of war to conquer the 
command of the air” (1994, p. 60).  Consequently, to accomplish all of the above 
hypotheses, Douhet said the Air Force must be independent.  During WWI, other air 
power pioneers encountered the psychological effects of German aviation.  The British 
had first-hand experience with the strategic bombardment from German Zepplins, which 
had traumatized the British homeland.  Hugh Trenchard, commander of the Royal Air 
Corps recognized how to exploit the moral influence of the airplane on an enemy in a 
strategic air offensive method to deter significant losses during WWI trenches and attacks 
on British territory. Trenchard believed the best way to handle the air arm in WWI was to 
…unify all aviation under one commander, to place the minimum 
number of airplanes necessary for the use of ground troops in action with 
each army, and to concentrate the bulk of bombardment and pursuit so that 
he could hurl a mass of aviation at any one locality needing attack. (1994, 
p. 52) 
 
Although Mitchell promoted his plans in a different way, his thinking was in line with 
Trenchard and Douhet in that, “his actions were to reserve as much as possible of the air 
power available to the Americans in a single strike force for the offensive” (1994, p. 52).  
He also said, “in order to unite and bring your greatest effect to bear in any one place it is 
necessary to unite all elements of your aviation at one place where the decision is called 
for...” (1994, p. 61).   
All three of these air power activists identified the need for an independent Air 
Force where the decisions could be made in one place, in other words organizationally 
centralized.   As a champion, Mitchell’s dedication to the pursuit of air power theory cost 
him a court-martial and eventually his career in order to promote the ideas that would one 
day become Air Force doctrine, but he laid the groundwork for further sponsorship.  His 
selfless sacrifice and devotion to service paved the way for many other air power 
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advocates that would recognize the same roadblocks, but in time would establish the Air 
Force as a separate service.  
 Although there were numerous innovative advocates of air power, it would take 
years for the U.S. to take military aviation seriously.  The U.S. did not suffer the losses 
their Allies encountered in the Great War and they had the Atlantic Ocean as a buffer.  
However, the growth of technology allowed the external threat to become more realistic 
and new air power advocates entered the scene:  1) New precision bombing techniques 
developed at America’s own Air Corps Tactical School showed strategic bombardment 
could be pinpointed and 2) Two new supporters, Henry “Hap” Arnold and Ira Eaker 
explained that air travel would make the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans look like the 
Mediterranean.  Hap Arnold utilized a different approach than Billy Mitchell.  He was 
dedicated to the Air Force as an institution to promote independence and a large bomber 
force without trampling those in his way.  He had a good reputation in Congress and in 
the public.  Strategic bombardment technology and Arnold’s political prowess led to 
President Roosevelt’s endorsement of long range bombing before the start of WWII.  
Arnold’s thoughts concerning a centralized organization were evident when he said, 
 The task of the military airman now departs from a crusading role. 
It becomes a task of organization on a tremendous scale. No longer do we 
require flaming leaders with fanatic zeal to sell a cause; we need sound, 
even-tempered minds of great resource and depth to perfect the plans and 
build the structure of an air force larger than the armies and navies of old. 
(1994, p. 102) 
 
Even though the U.S. was in the middle of a depression, Roosevelt increased the 
budget for the Air Corps and made more money available through the Public Works 
Administration, “expressly to buy airplanes and inject life into a dying aircraft industry” 
(Nalty, 1997, p. 136).  From this point forward, a separate Air Force was only a matter of 
time.  Arnold became Deputy Chief of Staff (For Air) in 1939.  During WWII, numerous 
congressmen introduced bills for an independent Air Force based on studies of the 
subject and public opinion.  Finally, President Truman signed the National Security Act 
of 1947, which established the U.S. Air Force as a separate organization.  In the 
aftermath of Pearl Harbor and in the face of future failure in conflict, increased external 
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threat, and with formidable proponents of air power, the U.S. was able to secure its future 
by creating a centralized Air Force.   
The creation of a separate Air Force can be used as an appropriate model needed 
to qualify the current IO organizational dilemma in DOD.  Several factors described in 
the Air Force are inherent in IO as well.  First of all, the degree to which IO will play in 
prospective military operations is unquestionable for the U.S. as well as other nations or 
small groups—it will be paramount.  Hence, an external threat exists.  Second, like the 
beginnings of air power, IO will offer its users an innate ability to strike at the central 
objective of its enemy and provides a new way of conducting warfare.  DOD should, like 
the past War Department, recognize the future threat of IO and realize that possible 
failures can occur.  Addressing the need of an innovative product champion, DOD should 
transfer this impetus to relative Air Force inception time periods.  Although Mitchell and 
other air pioneers clearly stated their concerns that would ultimately affect air power 
doctrine, it was not until Arnold’s political techniques surfaced that the Air Force made 
actual progress toward separation.  In other words, the air power advocate issue was 
mainly separate from the question of organizational centralization.  The chief thrust of 
centralization came from the external threat and possible failure in this new kind of 
warfare.  Albeit, DOD should “do as they say” and carry out the innovative thinking it so 
often stresses.  When the time is suitable, it should become the product champion for new 
IO doctrine. 
E. ANALYSIS—USSOCOM 
Susan Marquis’ description of the creation of USSOCOM is very detailed and 
provides another good example of the formation of a centralized organization due to 
recognized failure, no clear command structure, external threat, product champions and 
the inability to apply effective military force.   
As with the formation of a separate Air Force, recognized failure of the botched 
Iranian rescue attempt and needless loss in the Grenada operation was the final straw in 
the quest for a separate U.S. Special Operations Command.  Prior to these events, Special 
Operations (Spec Ops) had proven its worth in WWII and the Korean War.  “When the 
tensions that highlighted a need for special operations forces relaxed, however, the new 
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Special Forces group lost much of its support” (Marquis, p. 12).  Following Desert One, 
it was clear that something had to be done in order to preserve American military 
dominance.  Marquis describes the aftermath the best when she said,  
Iranian television footage of the burned bodies of U.S. servicemen 
and their aircraft in the Iranian desert horrified U.S. citizens and 
encouraged an international perception of U.S. impotence before a handful 
of Iranian students and a new revolutionary government. (Marquis, p. 3) 
 
Three years later, another Spec Ops failure would come to light during Congressional 
hearings that, “revealed the Grenada operation was badly mismanaged and may have 
involved unnecessary loss of life” (Adams, T., p. 193).  U.S. limits in the unconventional 
domain were now internationally exposed.  The recognition and public awareness of 
these failures magnified the importance of finding a solution to the U.S. Spec Ops 
problem.  One answer was to properly organize Spec Ops to prevent bad decision-making 
and mismanagement.   
 In the wake of such failure, the search was on to find out who was responsible. 
While U.S. air power had fallen under Army as it rose in significance, Spec Ops control 
was sprawling and diluted over all the military services, thus spreading out responsibility 
so no one was ultimately in charge.  Conventional leadership wisdom as a result of the 
“Fulda Gap” war, endorsed the doctrine of overwhelming the enemy with unlimited 
power, holding ground and confronting the enemy in direct conflict.  Therefore, any 
leadership attempt to promote clandestine operations, sabotage, and ambushes was seen 
as irrelevant and un-American.  Marquis describes the status of Spec Ops forces within 
the U.S. military as one with “precarious values” (1997, p. 7).  “Precarious values are 
those goals or missions within an organization that are in conflict with, or in danger of 
being overwhelmed by, the primary goals or missions of the organization” (Marquis, p. 
7).  Each service had its own perception of Spec Ops and in addition, thinkers whose 
primary motives were conventional warfare drew up the goals and objectives for these 
service-unique Spec Ops forces.  With this fractured management and direct resistance to 
its principles, Spec Ops had no identified responsible authority or command structure.  
Recognized failure, partly as a result of this lack of a clear chain of command, propelled 
the U.S. toward a more centralized approach to Spec Ops.   
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With rising tension in Vietnam and following another recognized failure in the 
Bay of Pigs, President Kennedy expressed his thoughts concerning Spec Ops, 
 This is another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its 
origins-war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins; war by 
ambush instead of combat; by infiltration, instead of aggression, seeking 
victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him...It 
requires in those situations where we encounter it...a whole new strategy, a 
wholly different kind of force, and therefore a new and wholly different 
kind of military training. (Marquis, p. 13) 
 
Mao Tse Dong and Ho Chi Minh identified a new, unconventional variant of warfare that 
offered the U.S. a viable external threat.  However, conventional leadership opposition 
and nonsupport within Kennedy’s own staff caused widespread misuse of Spec Ops as 
they were conventionalized.  In other words, Spec Ops forces were unable to effectively 
apply their military potency against this new kind of war, because military leadership 
used their unconventional talents in a conventional way.  This abuse clarifies the need for 
a separate Spec Ops command structure to make unconventional decisions at one place.  
A fractured Spec Ops status remained intact following the Vietnam conflict, because 
once again the need for Spec Ops had deteriorated as the U.S. began to concentrate on the 
Cold War.  The result of Spec Ops’ inability to appropriately apply its new kind of 
warfare as identified by an external threat and its lack of a centralized decision-making 
authority was the inevitable failures it experienced.  To solve this seemingly 
overwhelming problem, U.S. Spec Ops needed an all-encompassing answer that a 
separate command may provide.  
 Although well-publicized failures fueled the start of the centralization of Spec 
Ops, the most prominent factor in the formation of USSOCOM was the success of its 
product champions.  General Edward Meyer was one of the first to recommend a separate 
Spec Ops organization.  “He thought the United States could not afford to ignore the rest 
of the world while focusing on the Soviet threat” (Marquis, p. 62).  After becoming the 
Chief of Staff of the Army and following Desert One,  
he proposed a new combatant command called Strategic Services 
Command (STRATSERCOM), whose mission would be to counter 
terrorism in peacetime or in periods of conflict short of war, and to protect 
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the U.S. leadership and command and control centers in a major war with 
the Soviet Union. (Marquis, p. 73). 
 
Even though he recognized the military’s dedication to a potential WWIII, the response 
to his proposal was nonexistent.  “All the services feared STRATSERCOM as a fifth 
Service, feared it would take away their responsibilities and cut into their resources” 
(Marquis, p. 73).  It seems senior military leadership was more worried about resources 
and responsibility than preservation of national security.  The seesaw battle of Spec Ops 
utilization was now motivated by an all-out unconventional war within the very bowels 
of DOD itself.  Noel Koch, Lynn Rylander and Colonel George McGovern became Spec 
Ops strongest promoters.  As Marquis describes, Koch, a principal deputy in the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense (OSD), had a strong interest in counterterrorism.  McGovern 
became his military assistant and “he had a strong network all over the building 
(Pentagon), all over the country, and all over the world” (Marquis, p. 80).  When 
Rylander joined their fight, he had numerous contacts within DOD and he was a “fervent 
believer in the value of special operations forces and the need to look outside Central 
Europe for the most immediate threat to American national security interests” (Marquis, 
p. 80).  Like Billy Mitchell, each of these advocates was willing to sacrifice his time, 
career, and even life to advance U.S. military dominance.  When McGovern died in 1982, 
Koch was more determined than ever to build a Spec Ops Command.  While Koch 
spearheaded efforts within OSD, Rylander attacked Spec Ops foes in the Pentagon.  Koch 
created a Special Planning Directorate streamlining his authority to the SECDEF and put 
together the Special Operations Policy Advisory Group of retired, Spec Ops experienced 
general officers who outflanked Spec Ops opponents and put pressure on the SECDEF 
from the outside.  The result was a SECDEF-directed policy statement written by Koch 
and Rylander that ignited a JCS proposal to look at, “how best to organize to provide the 
CINCs with the best special operations capability” (Marquis, p. 85).  From this point, 
Koch shifted his tactics to a more public forum.  With gaining support in Congress, Koch 
increasingly highlighted the weakness of Spec Ops.  In 1984, Senator Strom Thurmond 
read one of Koch’s speeches into the Congressional Record.  In 1986, House and Senate 
appropriation committees directed DOD to report on, “the feasibility of creating a single 
command structure for special operations” (Marquis, p. 130).  Senators William Cohen 
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and Sam Nunn also entered the public debate recognizing the applicability of Spec Ops in 
aftermath of Desert One, Grenada and increasing terrorist actions.  Together, their 
influence on Spec Ops would become law in November 1986.  The Cohen-Nunn 
legislation established U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), formalized Spec 
Ops activities, and created Spec Ops funding separate from other services.  If not for the 
commitment of these supporters, Spec Ops would have continued its seesaw battle for 
recognition.   
 The U.S. military’s misuse and inability to efficiently utilize Spec Ops forces and 
its inadequate decision-making structure gave birth to internationally distinguished 
failures.  These failures coupled with the increasing external threat of terrorism and 
military operations other than war and with innovative advocates who realized Spec Ops 
significance enabled a centralized USSOCOM to become reality.   
 There are several points to emphasize in the formation of USSOCOM that are 
relevant to possible IO organization.  The USSOCOM case highlights several innovative 
supporters.  However, as in the Air Force case, the reasoning behind their existence is 
separate from the issue of organizational centralization.  In effect, the champions’ 
influence was substantial, but their efforts were the result of competition with 
conventional leadership resistance.  In the SOCOM case, unlike the Air Force case, 
failures in conflict occurred.  DOD has yet to experience any IO failure, but that does not 
indicate that it will not.  In the analysis of the Grenada failure, mishandled operations 
may have caused unneeded casualties.  Is DOD going continue an argument of ignorance 
and wait until they incur unnecessary IO related deaths before the organizational pitfalls 
of current IO policy are modified?  In DOD’s inspection of Spec Ops control, it found 
that ultimate responsibility was unknown and command guidelines were immeasurable.  
As discussed in the previous chapter, this also characterizes the current structure for IO.  
While IO may not be the object of resistance that Spec Ops was prior to SOCOM, it does 
lack a clear chain of command.  Also, like Spec Ops, each DOD organization, agency or 
individual service component maintains its own IO perception, since they have not come 
into contact with it before.  Allowing separate IO opinions may encourage misuse of IO 
assets and permit primary organization objectives to overpower any IO benefit.  Because 
IO guidelines are not centrally specified and because DOD lacks any sort of “Fulda Gap” 
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wisdom for IO, it makes it even more imperative to understand that this is a radically new 
kind of war.  Like unconventional warfare, IO requires a completely new strategy and a 
different kind of military force.  A new IO command may provide the responsible 
authority DOD needs to develop successful, cohesive IO doctrine. 
F. ANALYSIS—NORTHCOM 
With the recent events of 9/11 fresh on the minds of the world and the U.S. 
government, a new strategy seems to be solidifying.  Secretary of Defense, Donald 
Rumsfeld answered why this is happening, 
Current events should teach Americans the peril of the unexpected. 
We have to recognize that it is not possible to know every conceivable 
threat that can be posed against our country, friends, allies or deployed 
forces. We have to recognize the kinds of capabilities that exist and deal 
with those capabilities wherever they happen to come from. (Garamone, 
February 2002) 
 
Not only has this publicly recognized failure prompted quick action from the Department 
of Defense, but ever-growing external threats of possible second attacks and increased 
international terrorism has spurred another adjustment to the Unified Command Plan.   
According to DefenseLINK, DOD has released details of a new Unified Command Plan 
that includes the establishment of U.S. Northern Command (Garamone, April 2002).  
This new command structure will generate a military, “that is better equipped to defend 
the homeland from terrorist attacks...and create Northern Command that would be 
responsible for defending the borders, coasts and airspace of the United States” (Lerman, 
2002).  Here, DOD has also identified that it does not contain the proper structure, which 
allows an understandable chain of command.  Overall, DOD has prepared plans to 
establish another separate, centralized command structure in light of a well-known 
failure, recognized and unidentified external threats and a lack of a clear command 
structure for making appropriate and suitable decisions.   
 9/11 is a case that closely resembles why a new IO command may be pertinent at 
this time.  NORTHCOM demonstrates DOD’s ability to establish a suitable chain of 
command where it is nonexistent.  When it comes to U.S. military dominance and 
preservation of national security, DOD can react very quickly.  Although DOD has not 
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experienced an “electronic” 9/11, it has identified potential IO failures.  The SECDEF is 
also very clear about recognizing and dealing with external threats.  Is DOD going to 
remain in reaction-mode only or are they going to preempt the death toll experience of 
9/11?  Like NORTHCOM, a new IO command may be able to formulated a 
comprehensive plan that will preclude loss of international status and retain national 
security. 
G. ANALYSIS—AIR CORPS FOLLOWING WWI 
Following WWI, recognized failure and external threat for the United States were 
difficult to imagine.  Its entry into the Great War had prompted victory for the Allies.  
The U.S. did not recognize the reality of “gut-wrenching” trench warfare, because these 
conflicts were not fought on their own soil.  The Atlantic and Pacific Oceans stood 
between the U.S. and any external threat that an enemy might impose.   
Even though a centralized Air Corps did have its outspoken activists, they were 
considered “cowboys” that would not be recognized until WWII.  Not only were these 
first air power prophets disregarded, but an established War Department organization was 
difficult to fight.  At that time, the War Department was pleased to fall in line with 
isolationist’s ideals.  The buffer provided by large bodies of water alone offered the 
protection of American culture needed to preserve its independence.  There was also an 
adequate command structure where the Air Corps remained under Army ground control.  
When necessary, the Air Corps could provide essential ground support for the kind of 
war of that day.  
Overall, although there were several critics, the War Department did not see an 
external threat or failure following WWI, and the Air Corps was well established in the 
most successful warfare doctrine of the time, therefore no centralization of the Air Corps 
occurred. 
H. CONCLUSION—INFORMATION OPERATIONS (IO) COMMAND  
The U.S. takes great pride in being on the “leading edge” of information 
technology.  This means the U.S. military not only requires a technological information 
advantage, but it needs to be unsurpassed in its readiness and capability for IO in order to 
protect itself from all enemies.  “The mission of DOD is to provide the military forces 
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needed to deter war and to protect the security of the United States. Nothing less is 
acceptable to us, or to the American people” (DOD, 2001).  The cases above can be used, 
as appropriate models required for qualifying the current IO organizational dilemma in 
DOD.  Factors described in each case are essential in IO as well.  With the advent of the 
“Information Age” and the proposition of a fundamentally new kind of war, military 
operations involving IO is undeniable.  “The scale and pace of recent change have made 
traditional means of defining future military operations inadequate” (TRADOC, 1995).  
Presently, there is a major push for innovative thinking in DOD and the U.S. military.  
However, is the military really serious in its pursuit of innovative thinking or do we have 
to wait until the environment is sufficient to support change?  As seen in the preceding 
examples, groundbreaking thinkers influenced the future doctrine once a centralized 
organization was born, but although they were present, their concerns were not what 
ultimately caused organizational centralization.  Only when the time was right (i.e., 
failure in conflict and external threat) did their ideas rise in validity.  With these 
innovative supporters aside, it does seem that DOD may be killing valuable time in 
pursuit of a valid information operations (IO) plan.  Currently, like Spec Ops before 
USSOCOM, IO is spread out over individual services and DOD agencies resulting in 
broken management with no clear “belly-button”.  In order to resolve this problem, one 
option is to utilize the future-thinking methods that DOD considers so vitally essential.  
So far, IO activists are buried in separate organizations; however, that does not indicate 
the time for change is not right.  With that said and if feasible, DOD’s innovative mindset 
has an opportunity to provide centralized IO command that will allow the formation of IO 
specific goals and a clear line of responsibility.  NORTHCOM is a good example of how 
DOD can make fitting changes if desired.  As with NORTHCOM, not only does DOD 
have an external threat and possible or realized failure, IO has no clear chain of authority.  
No IO baseline exists and fractured responsibility can lead to inconsistent goals that can 
be overwhelmed by primary goals of decentralized units.  As in unconventional warfare, 
IO requires a new kind of strategy with an accompanying military organization.    
From the cases above, there seems to be enough evidence to determine an IO 
Command may be appropriate at this time.  There is an external threat and although there 
has been no noteworthy IO failure, there are recognized IO failure theories.  Also from 
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the above illustrations, DOD has suffered significant failures unrelated to IO.  It knows 
failures can and do happen and cannot plead ignorance.  This realization should be 
enough to seriously consider a radical change in current IO structure.  Does DOD have to 
wait until there is an “electronic” Pearl Harbor or 9/11 or can DOD learn from its 
mistakes?  In the wake of 9/11, NORTHCOM has appeared to centralize the decision-
making and force employment capabilities of the U.S. to prevent attacks on U.S. soil.  
Presently, there are continuing debates if this type of 9/11 action will spill over into the 
IO domain.  What are some examples of IO external threat and possible failures?  DOD 
should consider how China dramatically stepped up its cyber attacks on the U.S. 
following the P-3 incident and how U.S. hackers declared war on Arab countries 
following 9/11.  Also, take the recent California power troubles for instance; although 
this was not the product of information based attack, imagine if it was the result of enemy 
direct action.  Consider the consequences of an attack that resulted in long-lasting 
electricity blackouts in metropolitan areas where critical hospital care was closed down. 
Other examples of IO threats could be frozen bank accounts and ATMs from virus-
corrupted bank systems, or oil and gas sabotage in the middle of winter.  Our country will 
survive, but some of us may not.  These cases may not be as catastrophic as 9/11, but 
how many lost lives are too many?  It will still be a failure that infringes on our culture 
and freedom we enjoy.  “Are we going to a world where freedom is allowed to flourish” 
(Garamone, February 2002)?  Or will it be a world where electronic terrorism spreads 
from country to country until we are at the will of the information tyrants (Garamone, 
February 2002).  The U.S. holds the future of information operations in its hands.  
Historically, DOD has waited until it was too late to save precious lives.  If it begins with 
a centralized organization where the responsibility, planning and objectives can be 
determined, it may prevent needless suffering and promote the freedom it cherishes.  A 
new IO command may provide the responsible authority DOD needs to develop 
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IV. AN INFORMATION OPERATIONS ORGANIZATIONAL 
STRUCTURE MODEL 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Having examined what causes organizational centralization in DOD, it is now 
necessary to examine what a centralized structure for providing IO services to the CINCs 
and individual services would look like.  To that end, this chapter describes a generic 
organizational structure for providing IO services in the military environment.  It is 
generic in that it is not tied to an individual service, i.e., Army, Air Force, or Navy, and it 
is not tied to any of the existing unified commands.  The goal of the organizational 
structure described here is to provide the same services that are provided in the current 
military and, at the same time, provide increased capability that is realized through the 
centralization of efforts and resources.  The contention is that the centralization of the 
intellectual capital associated with IO will result in higher returns that can be seamlessly 
integrated throughout the DOD or any service via a single command that reaches into all 
aspects of the DOD or any service.  Finally, the model is intended to be applicable within 
the individual services or at the unified command level. 
B. TERMS 
The organizational structure used in this chapter is intended to be generic with 
regard to the branch of service or level of DOD to which it is applied.  In that regard, 
generic terms have been used to describe the various levels of any particular branch.  In 
order to assist with understanding the generic terms, an application of these terms in 
reference to the Air Force’s organizational structure is depicted in Figure 2.  The figure 
assumes corporate support is being provided to the AF.  The AF major command ACC is 
provided divisional support.  Unit or location support would be provided to a Special 
Tactics Squadron (STS) or Langley AFB, respectively.  Hopefully this will aid the reader 
in understanding the levels of command that are implied with the words corporate, 















Figure 2. Application of Terms 
C. THE STRUCTURE 
An organizational structure for implementing a consolidated approach to IO that 
meets the needs of individual units is depicted in Figure 3.  At the strategic apex 
(Mintzberg, 1993, p. 13) is the commander of the IO command.  The support staff and 
technostructure needed to support the commander and the command comprise legal, 
future concepts, commercial interface, and public affairs.  Legal and public affairs would 
compose the support staff (Mintzberg, 1993, p. 16).  Future concepts and commercial 
interface would compose the technostructure and would seek to standardize doctrine, 
tools, and methodology throughout the command and corporate service (Mintzberg, 
1993, p. 15).  The middle line comprises corporate support, divisional support, unit and 
location support, operations, and product development and distribution (Mintzberg, 1993, 
p. 14).  Divisional liaisons are formalized positions to facilitate coordination between the 
command level and the customers at the divisional level (Mintzberg, 1993, p. 92).  Each 
of the individual areas are described and expounded upon in the following sections. 
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Figure 3. IO Command Structure 
D. LEGAL 
IO Command
Legal Future Concepts CommercialInterface
Public Affairs DivisionalLiasons
 
Figure 4. Legal 
With the advent of the Internet and globalization, information sharing and privacy 
have become major concerns.  In addition, federal law places boundaries on the 
involvement of the military in domestic matters.  The design of new network attack tools 
and the defensive capability of tracking automated attacks dictates the need for legal 
professionals skilled in the areas of individual privacy and posse comitatus.  Such a 
function in the support staff, as depicted in Figure 4, would be able to create sufficient 
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expertise in these areas that does not currently exist.  As an example, when hackers attack 
individual units, the legal ramifications of tracking the hacker and the means of tracking 
often require a legal review (Adams, 1998, p. 194).  This places an unnecessary delay in 
the process of responding to hacker attacks.  As well, when IO attacks are needed against 
an adversary, the legal ramifications of the attack in regards to international law must be 
clearly presented to a combatant commander. 
E. FUTURE CONCEPTS 
IO Command
Legal Future Concepts CommercialInterface
Public Affairs DivisionalLiasons
 
Figure 5. Future Concepts 
According to many people, the military as a whole is currently in a revolution in 
military affairs based on the advancement and implementation of technology (Adams, 
1998, p. 56).  In order for an IO command to maintain pace with advancements in 
technology, a future concepts function, as depicted in Figure 5, will be needed at the IO 
command level.  Such a function would allow a single repository for advanced concepts 
in the realm of IO and would eliminate redundant efforts and expenditure of funds across 
other military commands.  A potential model for the make up of this function would be 
the battle lab concept implemented in the Air Force.  These labs were created in diverse 
areas to develop innovative new ideas and the implementation of these ideas in the 
existing force (Battlelabs, 2001).   
F. COMMERCIAL INTERFACE 
IO Command
Legal Future Concepts CommercialInterface
Public Affairs DivisionalLiasons
 
Figure 6. Commercial Interface 
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Historically, the military was the driving force in technology research and 
development.  This is no longer the case today.  Currently the commercial sector is 
driving the advances in technology (Adams, 1998, p. 57).  Indeed, the military’s current 
struggle is to take commercially developed products and implement them in the military 
environment.  A commercial interface, as depicted in Figure 6, working closely with 
future concepts, would potentially be able to drive commercial industry to develop 
products that could be more easily integrated in daily military IO.  As well, such a 
function would be an enabler for new levels of cooperation between the military and 
civilian sectors in regards to defensive information operations.  The lines between 
military and civilian communication systems and areas of strategic interest, i.e., power 
grids, financial systems, etc., is blurry at best.  Both sectors could greatly benefit from a 
partnership that facilitates information, technique, and idea sharing. 
G. PUBLIC AFFAIRS 
IO Command
Legal Future Concepts CommercialInterface
Public Affairs DivisionalLiasons
 
Figure 7. Public Affairs 
Public opinion has a major impact on any military operation and indeed the day-
to-day existence of the military (Marine Corps CDC, 1998).  The opinion of the taxpayer 
is of vital interest to the success of the military.  As an example, when casualties were 
incurred during the Beirut bombing of the Marine barracks and during operations in 
Somalia, the perception of a negative public opinion caused the respective 
administrations to terminate these operations.  The relaying of information to the public is 
a function of public affairs.  Similarly, perception management, attempting to control the 
perception of a respective audience, is a function of IO.  Therefore, the placing of public 
affairs, as depicted in Figure 7, in the IO command would facilitate managing the 
perception of the civilian sector, which is of vital interest to the military.  Ideally, this 
function would serve as the single point of public affairs for a particular branch of the 
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military.  This would enable all public affairs officers to “sing from the same sheet of 
music”. 













Figure 8. Product Development/Distribution 
Currently, there is little in the way of a consolidated approach to the development 
and distribution of IO related products and systems.  In order to accomplish this 
consolidation at a corporate or branch level, a product development and distribution 
function, as depicted in Figure 8, would need to be established within the IO command.  
This office would work closely with the future concepts and commercial interface offices 
to ensure compatibility of and the ability to integrate new products throughout the 
service.  As well, this function would work closely with an acquisition division at the 
corporate level. 
By placing this function within the IO command, new products could be 
seamlessly distributed throughout the organization, as needed, down to the individual unit 
or location.  Figure 9 depicts the interrelation between the future concepts, the 














Figure 9. Interrelation Diagram 




















































Figure 10. Corporate Support 
Each branch of the military is divided into divisions, i.e., MAJCOMS, that 
support a specific function or mission.  Case in point is the topic of this paper, an IO 
command, or division in the generic sense, which will support the specific function of IO.  
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As well, these divisions have subordinate bases or units.  These divisions and respective 
units would become the customer base for the IO command.  In order to meet the needs 
of these customers, a formal organization to provide divisional support, such as the one 
depicted in Figure 10, would need to be established within the IO command.  A 
divisional IO commander would report formally through the chain of command to the IO 
commander, but would meet the requirements of the branch divisional commander, or 
customer, in a matrix form.  Similarly, the unit/location IO commander would report 
formally to the division IO commander, but would meet the requirements of the branch 
unit/location commander who reports to the branch divisional commander.  To ensure 
that the respective IO commanders maintain focus on the customer in this matrix, 
divisional liaisons at the divisional office level will facilitate requirements, problems, etc. 
between the IO commander and the divisional commander.  The combination of a matrix 
association and the liaison position is intended to keep the natural inward focus of a large 
bureaucracy, which could be the result of creating the IOC, in check.  Figure 11 shows 
















Figure 11. Flow of Authority/Communication 
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At each IO divisional support level would be a computer emergency response 
team (CERT).  A CERT would also exist at each IO unit/location support level.  The 
purpose of these teams would be monitoring the network for intrusions or attacks.  This is 
a similar model to what is being done in the Navy and AF today (Adams, 1998).  Both 
divisional and unit CERTs would funnel information to the IO CERT, which would fulfill 
the corporate, or branch, responsibility for network monitoring.  The CERTs at the 
various levels would work together via formal and informal communication to 
cooperatively ensure the integrity of military data networks.  An IO CERT and divisional 
CERT are needed to provide big picture views of network attacks.  As an example, this 
hierarchical approach would be necessary to detect a consolidated effort to attack 
numerous sites within the military organization.  Figure 12 shows the process and 
communication flow for the CERT establishment. 
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Figure 12. CERT Process 
In the case of dedicated attack effort, a response team would be dispatched to the specific 
unit/location to handle the attack. 
44 
At each unit or location two IO support packages could be implemented.  The 
standard package would be implemented across the board as it contains the necessary 
functions for daily operations during times of peace and war.  The functions of the 
tailored package could be implemented at each unit or location as the mission of that unit 
or location dictates.  For example, a special operations unit would need self contained 
attack teams in order to mesh with small teams or forces typically used in a special 
operations environment.  As well, specialties regarding training could be integrated 
throughout a training division or implemented in unique areas, such as special operations.  
While these tailored functions would be integrated with the customer’s environment, they 
would still report through the IO command structure.  Such an arrangement would allow 
the most flexibility to the customer while still allowing IO resources to take advantage of 


























Figure 13. Operations 
The IO command would need the capability to provide operational support to all 
corporate areas during both time of peace and war.  The operations function of the IO 
command, depicted in Figure 13, would facilitate this function.  This organization would 
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be divided into three areas: combat support packages, attack teams, and the IO CERT 
with its associated response teams.   
The first area, combat support packages, would consist of a go-to-war capability 
needed to support a combatant CINC in any theater.  The number of packages could be 
determined by regional constraints, i.e., one for CENTCOM, EUCOM, PACOM, etc., or 
could be constrained by doctrine such as the ability to fight two simultaneous major 
regional conflicts.  A combat support package would provide a combatant commander 
with all the realms of IO needed to prosecute a war.  As well, it would provide the 
combatant commander with a single point of contact, the combat support package 
commander, for all IO related issues.  As an example, a JTF commander currently has a 
J6 that serves as the single point of contact for all communications requirements in 
support of the JTF’s mission.  Under this concept, this JTF commander would have a J-n, 
the combat support package commander that handles all IO related issues.  While this in 
effect is a centralization of functions to a single individual, it is also a decentralization of 
authority for currently separate tasks from the JTF commander to a single individual.  
During times of peace, the combat support packages would be integrated with combat 
units during exercises.  This would not only increase combat effectiveness, but would 
also facilitate the realization of the capabilities of IO as a combat enhancer.  A combatant 
commander who loses his combat capability due to the implementation of an IO attack 
will have a greater appreciation of IO, and it is better that this happen during a peacetime 
exercise as opposed to during actual combat.  Finally, a combat support package would 
also include a response and attack team who would report to the combat support package 
commander for the duration of the exercise or war. 
The second area is attack teams that would comprise expertise in legal issues, 
computer network attack, and intelligence.  Legal would be included for the same reasons 
already discussed regarding the legal function on the IO command staff.  Intelligence 
personnel would be required for determining desired target and effect.  The computer 
network attack personnel would be needed to facilitate the actual attack.  Intelligence and 
computer network attack personnel would work together to assess the effects of the 
attack.  The attack team is not integrated into the combat support package, because the 
combat support package is a major conflict response.  There may be times when an attack 
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team is needed when a major conflict is not occurring.  Finally, some attack teams may 
be integrated with actual units due to the specialty of the unit’s mission, as discussed in 
the corporate support section. 
The final area, the IO CERT, would fulfill the purposes already discussed in the 
description of the divisional section.  The response teams would be tasked by the IO 
CERT during peacetime and would be aligned in a matrix manner to the combat support 
package commander during times of war.   Legal, law enforcement, computer network 
defense, and intelligence personnel would comprise the response team.  Law enforcement 
and legal would work together to determine the means used in responding to the attack, 
i.e., the feasibility of a counter attack, tracking methods, etc.  Intelligence personnel 
would gather data on the nature, origin, and method of the attack.  As well, intelligence 
personnel would gather any data available on the human source of the attack.  The 
computer network defense personnel would repel, terminate, or allow, for the purpose of 
gathering intelligence, the attack.  If a counter attack is deemed legal and prudent, 
members from an attack team would augment the response team or an attack team would 
be dispatched to join the response team. 
K. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has described a centralized organizational structure for providing IO 
related functions in the DOD.  The attempt has been made to ensure the proposed 
structure provides for all aspects of IO.  As well, the structure attempts, through 
integration with the larger organization, to realize the gains that can be realized from 
centralization without leaving the larger organization bereft of the services the structure 
provides due to the inherent inward focus of large centralized, bureaucratic organizations.  
Components of the structure, i.e., Future Concepts, aid in realizing the benefits of pooling 
the intellectual capability associated with IO.  Similarly, components such as Corporate 
Support and Divisional Liaisons work to ensure the proposed organizational structure 
remains responsive to the larger organization as a whole. 
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V. AN APPLICATION OF THE MODEL 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Having looked at the generic model for creating an organizational structure 
necessary for efficiently implementing IO, the natural question occurs of what would this 
model look like in actual implementation?  To answer this question, we will look at 
implementing an IO organization at the unified command level.  For any such 
organization to be feasible, it must use existing organizations in new ways.  Due to the 
fiscal constraints of today’s defense budget, DOD cannot afford to build organizations, 
no matter how badly needed, from the ground up.  Keeping this principle in mind, this 
paper attempts to present a unified command for IO, appropriately called the United 
States Information Operations Command (USIOC).  Figure 14 depicts an organizational 
structure for the USIOC. 
The currently existing elements necessary to create such a command are 
determined by the description of an IO cell within a Joint Task Force (JTF) (Joint Pub 3-
13, 1998).  The rest of this chapter is spent discussing the elements of the structure in 
detail. 
B. LEGAL 
Research does not reveal any single joint or service associated legal body 
specializing in the realm of IO.  Therefore, the USIOC would have to develop this legal 
expertise.  The areas of knowledge would relate to the legalities of launching and 
responding to computer network attacks, implementation of psychological operations 
internationally, and general military law, i.e., Law of Armed Conflict.  This “pool” of 
knowledge would consist of enough personnel to support the operational assets of the 
unified command, advise the commander and other staff, and interface with other 
governmental legal bodies, i.e., FBI, Attorney General, etc.  Since this capability does not 
currently exist, the USIOC would potentially have to develop or support some form of 





























































Figure 14. USIOC 
C. FUTURE CONCEPTS 
The purpose of Future Concepts is to develop new and innovative means of 
performing IO related functions in the future.  Currently, the Joint Battle Center (JBC), 
under United States Joint Forces Command, is best poised to perform this function.  The 
JBC currently performs technology assessments of Command, Control, Communications, 
and Computers; Intelligence; surveillance; and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities 
(JBC Mission Brief).  The focus of these assessments is to identify and recommend 
technologies that are needed to support warfighter’s needs in the JTF.  This capability 
provides the foundation needed to enable the experimentation and assessment required 
for a Future Concepts function within the USIOC.  The only change that would need to 
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be made to the existing organization would be expanding the C4ISR capabilities with the 
other elements of IO, i.e., Psychological Operations (PSYOP), Civil Affairs (CA), 
Electronic Warfare (EW), etc.  By combining all these various elements into a single 
arena, i.e., Future Concepts, the visions of interoperability and collaboration become 
exponentially more achievable.  
D. COMMERCIAL INTERFACE 
Commercial Interface is the component of the command that works with 
commercial industry to both keep abreast of the latest advancements in technology and to 
ensure telecommunication assets essential to DOD operations are kept secure and 
available.  The candidate organization that exists today to fulfill this requirement is the 
Joint Program Office – Special Technology Countermeasures (JPO-STC).  The purpose 
of this program is to: 
… provide DOD decision-makers, Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs), 
and operational commanders with an analysis and assessment capability to 
identify critical infrastructure susceptibilities and operational 
dependencies that, if not assured, could adversely impact mission 
accomplishment of military operations vital to national security. (JPO-
STC Brochure). 
 
While this program does get into areas that are not directly related to IO, i.e., 
railroad systems, electric power, etc., it does include the areas essential to IO, i.e., 
telecommunications, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, etc.  As well, the 
additional areas relate to information needed by operational units and commanders, and 
this information represents what an IO command exist to provide, i.e., information 
superiority.  The only area that would need to be increased within JPO-STC is the focus 
on taking advantage of technological advancements in commercial industry.  This 
function would involve identifying key technologies and best practices utilized in 
industry.  Any key technologies could be feed to the future concepts function of the 
USIOC.  This would keep the two working together such that industry could feed the 
military, and the military could help identify threats to industry and ensure necessary 
safeguards are in place. 
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E. PUBLIC AFFAIRS (PA) 
Research does not indicate there is any joint or otherwise consolidated 
organization that supports the public affairs function within DOD such that there is a 
singleness of message.  The creation of a USIOC and its subordinate service level 
commands would create this ability.  Within the realm of IO, PA is a critical capability in 
the area of perception management.  This capability is needed to garner public support 
for military operations and to combat disinformation campaigns launched by enemy 
forces.  By creating this proposed structure for PA, the capability to train and educate PA 
officers and staff to facilitate perception management will exist.  With proper training, 
PA officers would be able to advise commanders on how the message should be 
portrayed as much as what the message should say.  This will provide CINCs, and the 
DOD as a whole, with a greater capability than the mere ability to serve as an information 
conduit that exists today.  Under the USIOC concept, USIOC would become the PA force 
provider for all DOD. 
F. CORPORATE SUPPORT 
Corporate Support comprises organizations that would support the sister unified 
commands of the USIOC and the DOD as a whole.  This area would be under the 
command of a single individual within the USIOC.  The areas that make up the Corporate 
Support that provide support to all sister commands and the DOD are the Joint Spectrum 
Center and the Joint Warfare Analysis Center.  The areas that provide support to the 
individual services are the component commands:  Army Information Operations 
Command (AIOC), Air Force Information Operations Command (AFIOC), and the Navy 
Information Operations Command (NIOC).  These last commands are commands that 
would need to be created as subordinate commands to the USIOC, similar to the way the 
component special operation commands are subordinate to the United States Special 
Operations Command (SOCOM). 
1. Joint Spectrum Center (JSC) 
In essence, the JSC ensures the availability of the frequency spectrum the DOD 
needs to allow seamless communications that are free of interference (JSC Mission).  
Also included under the responsibilities of JSC are the information assurance aspects of 
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information warfare as they apply to the spectrum dominance.  This capability would 
exist under the USIOC to facilitate supporting the C4ISR requirements of the JTC.  No 
additions or changes would need to be made to this agency, other than putting it under the 
command of the USIOC to facilitate relaying information to the component IO 
commands that are the JFC’s force providers.  In short, putting JSC under the USIOC is 
merely the process of aligning related functional support to functional force provision. 
2. Joint Warfare Analysis Center (JWAC) 
JWAC provides infrastructure analysis to CINCs for the purpose of directing 
force application.  This organization examines the civilian and military capabilities 
associated with a potential adversary from an infrastructure point of view.  As a provider 
of information critical to a warfighting CINC, this organization would fall under 
Corporate Support within the USIOC.  The advantage of placing JWAC under the control 
of the USIOC is found in the parts of the puzzle that JWAC does not currently provide.  
Under the umbrella of effects-based operations, being under the USIOC would increase 
the JWAC’s capabilities.  While JWAC looks at the physical, it does not look at the 
psychological, nor does it map network attack capabilities.  By combining PSYOP 
personnel with the capability of JWAC, it now becomes possible to provide a CINC with 
potential targets and the effect that neutralizing those targets has on the decision-maker’s 
will to continue the fight.  Add CA to the equation as well, and it becomes possible to 
determine the effect force application, to specific targets, has on the continued working of 
an enemy’s government.  As well, by combining network attack personnel with the 
capability of JWAC, the CINC has some middle ground in terms of physically destroying 
a target or just making the target inoperable.  To further add to the benefits from such an 
organization, the combatant CINC’s operational plans could flow through the enhanced 
JWAC for the purpose of developing the initial shell of a war plan or for the development 
of detailed regional plans.  By placing JWAC under the USIOC, it is possible for a single 
force provider to provide a list of targets and the effect of taking those targets out to a 
warfighting CINC. 
3. Service Components 
As stated earlier, each service would stand up a service component, similar to the 
way USSOCOM has the US Army Special Operations Command, the Air Force 
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Operations Command, and the Navy Special Warfare Command, that would be 
subordinate to the USIOC.  It is beyond the scope of this paper to describe these service 
components in detail, but a rough idea of the makeup of each is given here. 
The AIOC would be comprised of, at least, the Land Information Warfare 
Activity (LIWA), the 11th Signal Brigade, and the US Army Civil Affairs and 
Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC).  USACAPOC would be the lead 
service organization for satisfying the civil affairs and psychological operations manning 
requirements of USIOC.  In order to fully integrate these capabilities throughout the 
broad area controlled by the USIOC, manning levels within USACAPOC would probably 
have to be increased. 
The AFIOC would be comprised of, at least, the Air Intelligence Agency, the 
combat communications assets within the Air Force (AF), the Air Force Communications 
Agency, the Information Warfare Battle Lab, reconnaissance and surveillance flying 
assets, and any psychological operations assets within the AF.  The combinations of these 
assets would enable the creation of combat support packages, within the AF, that could 
provide a deployed wing commander the entire C4ISR package. 
The NIOC would be comprised of, at least, the Navy’s new information 
technology command and the Navy Component Task Force-Computer Network Defense 
(NCTF-CND).  With just a quick glance at the Navy, this command would be relatively 
small, as there does not seem to be a clear method of separating the Navy’s C4ISR 
functions from aboard ship.  However, creation of such a command could greatly 
facilitate the ability to push critical information to the “floating” war.  As well, the 
creation of attack teams would provide a shore-based asset for the sailing naval 
warfighter. 
G. PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT/DISTRIBUTION 
Combining the Joint Information Operations Center (JIOC) and the Joint 
Interoperability Test Command (JITC) would create Product Development and 
Distribution.  These two organizations have the unique skill sets that would be needed to 
create a single DOD source for the rapid development and deployment of C4ISR related 
systems and policy.  The implication of this capability is the USIOC, similar to 
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USSOCOM, would have the acquisition authority necessary for awarding contracts and 
the associated program management authority necessary for system development. 
The JIOC provides support to operational commanders by integrating operational 
security, PSYOP, military deception, electronic warfare, and destruction (Kreighbaum, 
1998).  JIOC also plays a role in the development of joint doctrine, tactics, techniques, 
and procedures in the aforementioned areas.  These capabilities combined with the ability 
to integrate various command and control database to form a common joint information 
base, make JIOC the prime candidate to develop IO related products and procedures and 
ensure distribution of these capabilities to the unified commands and individual services.  
The only change that would need to be made to JIOC would be a greater focus on the 
CNA and CND arenas as well as removing the requirement for JIOC to have deployable 
assets to assist combatant commanders.  These deployable assets would be integrated 
with the operations side of the USIOC organization.  Furthermore, this would allow JIOC 
greater ability to focus on the developmental side of IO without the worry of meeting or 
maintaining an unknown operational tempo.   
To complete the product development and distribution organization, the JITC 
would have to be added.  The JITC, which currently belongs to the Defense Information 
Systems Agency (DISA), performs interoperability testing on C4I and combat support 
systems (JITC Mission/Vision, 2001).  This capability would be essential to any product 
development and distribution function within the USIOC.  As new systems are 
developed, their interoperability with existing systems could be determined by the JITC.  
By combining JITC with JIOC, interoperability testing can begin with system 
development and be an integral process as opposed to a final hurdle for system 
development that could potentially delay or stop system release.  At the unified command 
level, this capability could also be used to ensure service level systems are interoperable 
with other service systems and with joint systems, by either mirroring this capability as 
the subordinate component level or requiring all system development efforts to work 
closely with the USIOC.  Currently, the DOD lacks a joint development activity to 
overcome the interoperability hurdle.  While joint program offices do exist, they usually 
exist with a particular service being named the lead for the program.  Human nature 
dictates that a service lead agency will always have the concerns of its mother service 
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foremost on its mind.  Under the USIOC, joint systems could be developed and 
disseminated in a truly joint environment. 
H. OPERATIONS 
The USIOC, as a supporting unified command, would require an operational 
capability to support the needs of the combatant commands during times of hostility.  
Within the USIOC, a single individual would be designated in charge of all operational 
assets within the USIOC.  These assets would consist of one or more combat support 
packages with the number being determined by either national objectives, i.e., the ability 
to maintain two major regional conflicts simultaneously, or by maintaining one to support 
each regional commander.  Since each service component of the USIOC would maintain 
a deployable capability as well, the first rule would probably be the most feasible for 
determining the number of combat support packages needed.  As well as combat support 
packages, there would need to be an Information Operations Computer Emergency 
Response Team (IOCERT) to ensure the capability is maintained to monitor DOD 
networks during times of hostility and peace.  Finally, the capability to have deployable 
CNA teams under the operations function would be needed to perform automated attacks.  
The reason for having deployable teams is that access to a specific enemy’s networks 
may only be possible by physical presence at a specific node within the enemy’s network.  
An example would be any country that is not directly connected to the Global 
Information Infrastructure, a.k.a., the Internet; currently, Iraq is not connected to the 
Internet due to United Nations sanctions. 
1. Combat Support Package(s) 
The core for the combat support package would be the Joint Communications 
Support Element (JCSE) (C4ISR Handbook).  JCSE is an elite communications unit that 
has the capability to support two JFCs and two Joint Special Operations Task Force 
(JSOTF) commanders.  With its ability to deploy in 24 hours, JCSE is an ideal candidate 
for providing the core of any combat support package.  In order to be fully viable under 
the concept of the USIOC, the elements of intelligence, electronic warfare, 
reconnaissance, PSYOP, CA, PA, and legal would have to be added.  Some of these 
elements would come from JIOC’s current deployable assets.  If the need dictated, CNA 
teams could be added to the package as well.  From an IOCERT point of view, 
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monitoring the deployed networks could be handled from the IOCERT itself without 
needing to deploy any assets.  This integrated capability would give a JFC or JSOTF 
commander a single staff element responsibly for all C4ISR capabilities.  These 
commanders would no longer need to worry about the needs of a J2, intelligence, and the 
needs of a J6, communications, as separate issues because they would all be rolled into 
one under the combat support package approach.  To further increase the capability of the 
combat support package and the usability to the combatant CINC, the package, or 
packages, would be able to tailor to meet the specific needs of the combatant CINC.  For 
example, if the CINC only needed a PSYOP capability, only those assets would be sent 
to support the CINC.  Also, under the USIOC, the combat support package could deploy 
with information developed by the enhanced JWAC, which increases the ability to apply 
rapid effects-based operations, assuming the CINC has the operational assets required in 
place.  Finally, the combat support capability directly under the control of the USIOC 
would primarily be used for scenarios that require quick reaction. 
2. Information Operations Computer Emergency Response Team 
(IOCERT) 
The IOCERT exists today, but it is not used or placed in the logical or unified 
manner needed to be the most effective.  The Joint Task Force – Computer Network 
Operations (JTF-CNO) is tasked to provide the defense of all DOD networks and, when 
called upon, to perform CNA activities (JTF-CNO Fact Sheet, 2001).  Currently this JTF 
is aligned under the US Space Command (USSPACECOM), a supporting command.  
Aligned under USSPACECOM, the automated aspects of IO, i.e., CNA and CND, are 
separated from the non-automated aspects of IO, i.e., PSYOP, CA, etc.  This results in 
CNA and CND operating in a vacuum and disjoint from the capability to field an 
integrated and unified IO capability to the combatant commands.  Under the USIOC, this 
capability would be under the same “roof” as the other capabilities of IO.  No changes 
would need to be made to the organization.  Currently, the service level network 
monitoring activities are responsible to the JTF-CNO.  Under the USIOC, this relation 
would stay the same, as the aforementioned activities would be under the command of 
the service level components, discussed earlier, that would be subordinate to the USIOC.  
At this time, the JTF-CNO is responsible for CND and CNA functions.  In the original 
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model for providing IO, the CNA functions were separated from the CND functions, but 
this is not a mandatory separation as long as the IOCERT maintains deployable CNA 
teams capable of supporting combat support packages.  As well, the CND teams would 
need to be deployable to support incident response in the case of a detected intrusion.  It 
is unknown if the JTF-CNO maintains legal and law enforcement functions within its 
organization, but if not, these functions would need to be added.  The goal of the 
IOCERT is to form a single integrated capability to defend against network attacks and to 
attack the network of an opponent.  In order to accomplish this, the service level 
components and any JTF functions must be subordinate to a unified agency such as the 
IOCERT. 
I. DIVISIONAL LIAISONS  
The function of a divisional liaison capability is to ensure the units supported, in 
this case the combatant commanders, have an avenue to relay their needs to the 
commander of the USIOC.  It is a means for the commander of the USIOC to ensure his 
or her people “on the scene” are meeting the requirements of the supported unit or 
command.  In the USIOC, this function would be accomplished by creating IO 
commands (IOC) within the regional commands.  This is similar to the USSOCOM 
model where individual Special Operations Commands are established in the regional or 
combatant commands.  As with the USSOCOM model, the IOC commanders would be 
subordinate to the combatant commander but would receive funding and administrative 
guidance from the USIOC.  Similar to the JFC, this would reduce a combatant 
commander’s staff by providing a single focal point for the J2 and J6 functions.  As well, 
these IOC commanders would be the conduit for passing operational plans to functions 
under support within the USIOC, i.e., JWAC and JSC.  Additionally, these commanders 
would work with the Product Development and Distribution function within the USIOC 
to ensure the systems being developed meet the needs of the combatant commander.  The 
IOC commanders would also provide the conduit for request a combat support package 
during a time of crisis or hostility.  In short, the IOC commanders would facilitate the 
ability of the USIOC to meet the combatant commander’s IO needs for both peace and 
wartime.   
 
57 
J. INTERRELATION WITH OTHER DOD AGENCIES 
1. Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) 
The USIOC and its service level components would be the bridge between DISA 
and the rest of DOD.  In this function, the USIOC would facilitate agreements for 
backbone access to the defense information infrastructure during both peace and wartime.  
DISA’s DOD CERT would be consolidated with the IOCERT, as these two functions 
would form an unnecessary redundancy if they both existed. 
2. National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) 
The relationship between the NRO and the DOD would not change under the 
USIOC concept.  The only change would be that the information NRO currently provides 
the DOD would flow through the USIOC and its subordinate units, since the USIOC 
would control the intelligence assets within the DOD. 
3. National Security Agency (NSA) 
As with the NRO, the only change between the NSA and the DOD would be that 
the information provided by NSA would flow through the USIOC and its subordinate 
assets. 
4. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) 
As with the NSA, the only change between the DIA and the DOD would be that 
the information provided by the DIA would flow through the USIOC and its subordinate 
assets. 
5. Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) 
Currently, the CJCS is tasked with ensuring the C4I needs of the combatant 
commanders are met.  With the creation of the USIOC, the commander of the USIOC 
would be given this task.  This allows the individual most equipped with the ability and 
assets to fulfill the task at hand.  In other words, the individual that controls the assets and 
development of such assets would be the one ensuring the asset requirements of the 
combatant commanders are met. 
K. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has attempted to demonstrate the feasibility of actually implementing 
the generic organizational structure depicted in the previous chapter.  In addition to 
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feasibility, the effort has been made to describe some of the cooperative benefits that can 
be gained by implementing such a structure. 
The creation of the USIOC makes a great deal of sense from both a material and 
operational point of view.  It would allow the development of IO related capabilities 
without the worry of unnecessarily redundant capabilities being created because “no one 
is in charge” of the overall IO picture.  As well, an USIOC would bring various support 
functions under one roof to ensure unity of effort, command, and application.  Such a 
capability would allow operational commanders of the combat variety the ability to focus 
on the area they are most qualified to focus on, which is what direct force assets to utilize 
in order to achieve victory.  With the creation of the USIOC, the combatant commander 
would no longer have to focus on what to strike, what are the ramifications of hitting a 
specific target, how to communicate with higher echelon, merely how to apply direct 
force to best achieve mission accomplishment. 
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VI. MODELING THE MODEL: A CULTURE OF KNOWLEDGE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the gains that can be realized by 
working within a community such as the one that would be created if the IOC were 
established.  This demonstration is accomplished by modeling an abstract organization 
derived from the description of an IO cell as described in Joint Pub 3-13, Joint Doctrine 
for Information Operations.  The modeling software used here is Vite©.  Vite© has been 
used to demonstrate the quantitative difference in accomplishing the creation of an IO 
plan between team members with varying skills and skill levels.  Two scenarios are used.  
The first scenario uses team members who have a high degree of skill in their individual 
specialty, but a low degree of skill in other areas.  Such a scenario would be similar to a 
situation that would exist if a JTF were formed, and various people who had not worked 
together in creating an IO plan were thrown together for such a purpose.  In contrast, the 
second scenario simulates a situation where the individuals working together on an IO 
plan have a high degree of expertise in their given specialty and a medium degree of 
expertise in the other specialty areas.  This medium degree of specialty is based on the 
existence of an IOC, in which the personnel involved in IO planning would have worked 
and exercised together prior to the creation of the JTF.  In other words, the second 
scenario attempts to simulate the gains that can be realized by having people work 
together in an organization and benefit from cross knowledge and thus develop a 
common understanding or a culture of knowledge. 
B. ABOUT VITE 
Vite© is a commercially developed simulator that is based on research 
accomplished at Stanford University (Vite©, 1996).  Using Vite©, managers are able to 
design organizations by building and analyzing computational models of planned 
organizations and the processes that they support.  As well, it can be used to consider the 
details involved with project performance and compare these details against modified 
versions of the organization.  This is accomplished by linking a project plan, an 
organization, and a simulator that uses discrete event simulation to simulate project 
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accomplishment.  Graphical outputs provide such information as:  predicted time to 
complete the project, the total amount of effort involved, and various other measures of 
project quality.  The conceptual framework of the simulation consists of an activity 
model, an actor model, and the simulator.  Activity models represent the projects or 
products the organization is accomplishing.  As well, each activity requires a primary 
skill necessary for accomplishing the activity.  The “actors” are the personnel involved in 
product or project accomplishment.  Each “actor” is assigned one to many skills with the 
degree of expertise for each skill capable of being set to high, medium, or low.  As well 
as simulating actors executing or working on activities, the simulator also simulates 
information exchanges between activities.  This functionality is needed when information 
from one activity is needed in the execution of a separate activity. 
C. MODEL OVERVIEW 
As stated previously, this chapter focuses on attempting to model a portion of the 
proposed IOC to demonstrate the benefits that can be realized by creating a single 
organization that focuses on the realm of IO.  To that end, two scenarios of a cell 
attempting to develop an IO plan for a JTF are modeled.  Such a cell would nominally be 
a subset of the combat packages within the IOC that would support a JFC.  This section 
covers the similarities between the two scenarios, i.e., the activities, the actors, and 
information exchanges. 
1. The Actors 
The actors simulated in the model are the IO Officer, Intel Officer, PSYOP 
Officer, CNA Officer, EW Officer, PA Officer, CA Officer, and Legal Officer.  Each of 
these actors is responsible for an individual process or product.  Each actor has a varying 
degree of skill in the following areas:  Intel, PSYOP, Communications (used for CNA), 
PA, CA, EW, Legal and IO. 
2. The Activities 
The activities simulated are:  IO Plan, Intelligence (Intel) Product, Rules of 
Engagement (ROE), Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Plan, Computer Network Attack 
(CNA) Plan, Electronic Warfare (EW) Plan, Public Affairs (PA) Plan, and Civil Affairs 
(CA) Plan. 
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a. IO Plan 
The IO Plan is the consolidated plan for the JTF and requires skill in IO.  
It consists of the PSYOP Plan, the CNA Plan, the EW Plan, the PA Plan, and the CA 
Plan.  The fact that the IO plan is an integration of the various other plans is represented 
in the simulation by information exchanges between the various singular activities and 
the IO plan.  As well, these information exchanges represent the process of ensuring the 
various plans work together in a synergistic manner.  By synergistic, it is meant that the 
plans do not conflict with each and represent a single, consolidated, and collaborative 
approach to IO.  The actor responsible for the IO Plan is the IO Officer, who is also in 
charge of all the other actors.  The main purpose of the IO Plan activity is to simulate the 
management and leadership process executed by the IO officer. 
b. Intel Product 
The Intel Product activity simulates the process of gathering the relevant 
intelligence needed to develop the various individual products and the overall IO Plan 
and requires the skill of Intel.  For the purpose of the model, it is assumed that all that is 
required for accomplishing this activity is gathering existing intelligence data.  In other 
words, this activity does not represent the actual gathering of intelligence through various 
sensor platforms, be they electronic or human.  The actor responsible for developing the 
Intel Product is the Intel Officer.  Information exchanges are modeled between the Intel 
Product, the PSYOP Product, the CNA Product, and the EW Product.  The rationale for 
these information exchanges is that those various products will need intelligence data to 
determine targeting data and means of attack based on the target and any associated 
defenses. 
c. ROE 
The ROE Product simulates the process of determining the legal targets 
and means of attacks based on the commander’s intent and the available list of targets, 
and it requires legal skills.  The actor responsible for this activity is the Legal Officer.  
Information exchanges exist between the ROE Product and the PSYOP Plan, the CNA 
Plan, the EW Plan, and the PA Plan.  The rationale for these information exchanges is 
similar to the information exchanges for the Intel Product in that these various products 
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will need to know what targets and means of attack are legal per the commander and 
existing national and international law.  For the exchange with the PA Plan, the rationale 
is that the PA Plan will need to account for what is and what is not releasable 
information. 
d. PSYOP Plan 
The PSYOP Plan activity simulates the development of a traditional 
PSYOP Plan and requires the skill of PSYOP.  For the purpose of the model it is assumed 
that a National Command Authority approved plan does not exist and that the approval 
authority has been delegated to the JFC.  The actor responsible for this activity is the 
PSYOP Officer.  Information exchanges exist between the PSYOP Plan and the CNA 
Plan, the EW Plan, and the PA Plan.  The rationale for the information exchanges 
between the PSYOP Plan and the CNA Plan is that these two plans will need to know not 
only the operational impact of successful attacks against their respective targets, but the 
psychological impact as well.  Similarly, the PSYOP Plan will have to account for the 
change in the target audience’s mindset as a result of successful EW and CNA attacks.  
The information exchange with the PA plan is needed for the purpose of perception 
management conflicts.  For example, if the PSYOP Plan involves convincing a target 
audience that a given situation is X, then the PA Plan, through information releases, 
would not want to give the perception that the situation is actually Y, where X and Y are 
not coherent. 
e. CNA Plan 
The CNA Plan activity simulates the creation of a CNA Plan and requires 
the skill of communications.  The actor responsible for the CNA Plan is the CNA Officer.  
As previously stated, an information exchange exists between this plan and the developed 
ROE because the creators of the CNA plan will need to know the legalities involved with 
specific targets and means of attack.  Additionally, an information exchange exists 
between the CNA Plan and the EW Plan.  The rationale for this information exchange is 
to ensure that the two plans do not overlap regarding intended targets.  For example, if 
the CNA plan involves an attack against an integrated enemy air defense system, one 
would not want an EW attack to result in the destruction of the system, thus preventing a 
CNA that could conceivably co-opt the system.  By exchanging information, the actors 
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involved with the two plans can collaborate and ensure a single cohesive plan that 
achieves optimal results. 
f. EW Plan 
The EW Plan activity simulates the creation of an EW Plan and requires 
the skill of EW.  The actor responsible for the EW Plan is the EW Officer.  The only 
information exchanges for the EW Plan are the previously mentioned exchanges between 
the IO Plan and the CNA Plan. 
g. PA Plan 
The PA Plan activity simulates the creation of a PA Plan beyond the 
traditional PA plan of hosting media sources and coordinating information releases and 
requires the skill PA.  Due to the information exchanges previously mentioned with ROE 
and the PSYOP Plan, this activity attempts to simulate a PA Plan that practices 
perception management.  In other words, this activity attempts to simulate the creation of 
a plan that would not only satisfy the media’s thirst for information, but would also 
attempt to shape public opinion in a manner conducive to the overall goals of the 
campaign and related operations.  In this vein, an additional information exchange exists 
between the PA Plan and the CA Plan.  The rationale for this exchange is so the activities 
of the CA Plan can be incorporated into the PA Plan.  Then PA personnel can release 
information that could potentially cast a positive light on the JTF and its associated 
coalition or governmental body. 
h. CA Plan 
The CA Plan activity simulates the creation of a traditional CA Plan and 
requires CA skills.  The actor responsible for the CA Plan is the CA Officer.  Information 
exchanges between the CA Plan and the PA and IO plans have been addressed 
previously. 
3. Activity Flow 
The flow of activities is determined by establishing a successor activity for each 
activity.  In this model the activities start when the commander’s intent is received.  Once 
this intent is received, work begins on developing the overall IO Plan and the Intel 
Product.  Work beginning on the IO Plan is merely representative of the IO Officer 
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beginning the planning process.  Once the Intel Product is complete, work begins on the 
CA Plan, PSYOP Plan, and ROE.  To reduce potential conflict between the PSYOP Plan 
and the PA Plan, the PA Plan begins after the PSYOP Plan is completed.  Similarly, work 
does not begin on the CNA Plan and EW Plan until the ROE is complete so the legality 
of targets can be determined.  After the ROE is completed, work begins on the CNA Plan 
and EW Plan, which once completed go to the end of the process, called execution.  
Likewise, once work begins on the PA Plan, which started after completion of the 
PSYOP Plan, the PA Plan goes to execution.  Also, the IO Plan and CA Plan go to 
execution once completed.  The integration of the various plans into a comprehensive IO 
plan is simulated via the previously mentioned information exchanges.  Finally, each 
activity takes five days to complete with the exception of the IO Plan, which takes 15 
days in an ideal environment.  These durations were selected arbitrarily, but remain the 
same in both scenarios to ensure comparable results. 





















Figure 15. IO Cell Vitae© Model 
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The model described is depicted in Figure 15.  The lines leading from the actors at 
the top of the model to the activities in rectangles at the bottom represent the assignment 
of actors to activities.  The solid lines leading from activity to activity indicate activity 
succession, with the arrow designating the successor of a previous activity.  The dashed 
lines between activities indicate information exchanges between activities.  Finally, the 
overall process starts with “CC Intent” and ends with “Execution”. 
The key to the model is the information exchanges.  Where there is an 
information exchange between two activities, the degree of success for the exchange will 
depend on the skills of the actor.  For example, the exchange of information between the 
ROE and PSYOP Plan products will depend on the ability of the actors to understand 
what others are working on.  If the PSYOP Officer has some level of understanding 
regarding the Intel Officer’s skill, which was used to create the ROE product, then the 
information exchange will go smoothly.  In effect, a real world scenario of a PSYOP 
Officer and an Intel Officer carrying on a conversation is being modeled.  The more the 
two players have in the way of common knowledge, the easier their ability to 
communicate will be.  A high degree of this simulated ability to communicate can result 
in the overall process being accomplished in less than the specified 15 days; conversely, a 
low degree of simulated communication ability can cause the overall process taking in 
excess of the specified 15 days. 
D. SCENARIO 1 
As previously stated, scenario 1 simulates various personnel being drawn together 
to develop an IO Plan for a JTF.  For the purpose of the simulation, it is assumed these 
people have never worked together in a collaborative environment before.  This scenario 
models a typical situation where diverse individuals from diverse career fields have come 
together for the purpose of IO planning.   
1. Skill Levels 
The assumption is made that, since these individuals are not members of a single 
organization, they have a low degree of expertise in the other’s career field.  Since 
current doctrine requires that the IO Officer come from the operations community, it is 
assumed that the IO Officer only has a medium degree of skill in IO.  Finally, it is 
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assumed that all the actors in scenario 1 have a low level of experience in the application 
of developing an IO Plan.  Table 2 depicts the various skill levels of the actors in scenario 
1. 


















IO Medium Low Low Low Low Low Low Low 
Intel Low High Low Low Low Low Low Low 
PSYOP Low Low High Low Low Low Low Low 
Comm Low Low Low High Low Low Low Low 
EW Low Low Low Low High Low Low Low 
PA Low Low Low Low Low High Low Low 
CA Low Low Low Low Low Low High Low 
Legal Low Low Low Low Low Low Low High 
Table 2. Scenario 1 Skill Levels 
2. Results 
The results for simulating scenario 1 are depicted below in Table 3.  The overall 
length of time taken to develop the IO Plan was 43 days.  Due to the lack of common 
knowledge between the players, some tasks have taken longer than the allotted five days 
due to an inability to efficiently exchange information. 
Scenario 1 
Activity 




CC Intent   21-Mar-02   
Intel Product Intel Officer 21-Mar-02 9 Days 
IO Plan IO Officer 21-Mar-02 43 Days 
ROE Legal Officer 30-Mar-02 2 Days 
PSYOP Plan PSYOP Officer 30-Mar-02 10 Days 
CA Plan CA Officer 30-Mar-02 9 Days 
CNA Plan CNA Officer 2-Apr-02 2 Days 
EW Plan EW Officer 2-Apr-02 10 Days 
PA Plan PA Officer 10-Apr-02 9 Days 
Execution   3-May-02   
Table 3. Scenario 1 Results 
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E. SCENARIO 2 
As previously stated, scenario 2 simulates personnel from an existing IOC being 
tasked with developing an IO Plan for a JTF.  For the purpose of the simulation, it is 
assumed that these people work together in a day-to-day environment and engage in 
routine wargaming exercises that involve the development of an IO Plan.   
1. Skill Levels 
Due to the fact that these actors work together in a day-to-day environment, it is 
assumed that they have a medium degree of skill in one another’s career field.  As well, 
since the individuals modeled in scenario 2 engage in wargaming exercises, it is assumed 
that they have a high degree of experience in the application of developing an IO Plan.  
Table 4 depicts the various skill levels of the actors in scenario 2. 


















IO High Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium 
Intel Medium High Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium 
PSYOP Medium Medium High Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium 
Comm Medium Medium Medium High Medium Medium Medium Medium 
EW Medium Medium Medium Medium High Medium Medium Medium 
PA Medium Medium Medium Medium Low High Medium Medium 
CA Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium High Medium 
Legal Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium High 
Table 4. Scenario 2 Skill Levels 
2. Results 
The results for simulating scenario 2 are depicted below in Table 5.  The overall 
length of time taken to develop the IO Plan was 14 days.  Due to the common knowledge 
between the players, some tasks have been accomplished prior to the allotted five days 









CC Intent   21-Mar-02   
Intel Product Intel Officer 21-Mar-02 4 Days 
IO Plan IO Officer 21-Mar-02 14 Days 
ROE Legal Officer 25-Mar-02 1 Day 
PSYOP Plan PSYOP Officer 25-Mar-02 5 Days 
CA Plan CA Officer 25-Mar-02 4 Days 
CNA Plan CNA Officer 26-Mar-02 1 Days 
EW Plan EW Officer 26-Mar-02 5 Days 
PA Plan PA Officer 30-Mar-02 4 Days 
Execution   5-Apr-02   
Table 5. Scenario 2 Results 
F. ANALYSIS 
The immediate analysis of the simulations is that scenario 2 supports the assertion 
that personnel from an organization who have knowledge of one another’s varying skills 
are more able to develop a timely product than personnel who have no familiarity with 
each other’s skill sets.  However, this assertion can easily be argued against based on the 
fact that the single activity driving overall task duration in each scenario was the IO Plan.  
Furthermore, the IO Officer in scenario 1 had a medium skill level in his primary skill, 
IO, and a low level of experience in developing an IO Plan.  The combined effect would 
be that the IO Officer was the cause of the elongated task duration in scenario 1.  Thus, 
the argument could be made that by merely training IO Officers, the military could 
improve its capability to do IO planning and would not need to create an organization to 
promote a culture of knowledge.  Based on this proposed argument, it is necessary to 
compare the activity durations with each scenario individually to see if there is a 
quantitative advantage to be gained from having an organization that provides a culture 
of knowledge.  Table 6 illustrates the differences in activity duration between the 







Assigned To Simulated 
Duration - 
Scenario 1 in Days
Simulated 
Duration - 





CC Intent      
Intel Product Intel Officer 9 4 5 55.56% 
IO Plan IO Officer 43 14 29 67.44% 
ROE Legal Officer 2 1 1 50.00% 
PSYOP Plan PSYOP Officer 10 5 5 50.00% 
CA Plan CA Officer 9 4 5 55.56% 
CNA Plan CNA Officer 2 1 1 50.00% 
EW Plan EW Officer 10 5 5 50.00% 
PA Plan PA Officer 9 4 5 55.56% 
Execution      
Table 6. Scenario Analysis 
As shown in Table 6, each area showed a minimum 50 percent improvement in 
regards to task duration from scenario 1 to scenario 2.  As a reminder, the only difference 
between the skills of the actors from scenario 1 to scenario 2 was that each actor went 
from a low to medium level of skill in his counterpart’s skill area and from a low to high 
level of experience in regard to the application of building his portion of a consolidated 
IO Plan.  This is in line with the guidance provided in the Vite© software that states little 
experience and excellent skill indicate the application experience be set to low and the 
skill level be set to high, as was the case in scenario 1.  In scenario 2, the skill and 
application levels were both set to high, which is once again in line with the guidance 
provided in Vite©, which states that lots of experience and excellent skills indicate the 
application experience and skill level both be set to high. 
G. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this chapter was to use commercial modeling software to 
determine if there were a quantitative difference between having individuals from an IO 
organization, as opposed to individuals who had no previous working relationship, 
accomplish a task.  This was accomplished by having various actors with various skill 
sets accomplish the task of developing an integrated IO plan.  Modeling the difference 
between the individuals from an organization and individuals with no previous working 
relationship was accomplished by varying the skill sets of the individual actors.  For the 
personnel from an organization, their skill in areas outside their specific area of expertise 
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was increased based on the contention that working in a common environment would 
give them a better than casual familiarity with their peer’s area of expertise.  For the 
scenario in which the participants had not previously worked together, their skill in their 
peer’s area of expertise was set to low based on the contention that the individual 
participant would have come from their own functional community and thus have had a 
low level of knowledge in their peer’s area of expertise. 
The results of the model provide strong support for having individuals from an 
organization who have a working knowledge of their peer’s area of expertise accomplish 
a task.  In the context of this thesis, the results of the model support the creation of an IO 
command that would foster the sharing of knowledge for the purpose of accomplishing 
IO related tasks.  While this model only compared task durations as the metric for 
supporting the aforementioned contention, one can reasonably assume that the quality of 
an integrated product would increase as the knowledge of the various actors in the 
various skills required to develop the integrated product increased.  While the IOC is not 
the only way to create such a community of knowledge, a benefit of the IOC would be a 
community of knowledge.  In addition, if the IO cell came from an IO command that 
owned the intelligence gathering assets and data, then request for assistance from the cell 
would be like one-stop shopping where the storeowner has a vested interest in the 
shopper.  In short, by creating an IO command, a community of knowledge can be 




We have seen the inherent problems in the U.S. military’s current approach to IO.  
First, the centralized direction which unity of command offers is clearly absent.  This lack 
of unity also promotes individual objectives, direction and doctrine with little 
consolidation of effort across service-specific command lines and across the military 
services themselves.  With little shared efforts in the military’s approach to IO, the 
inevitable fallout is redundancy that increases the costs of moving forward in the 
information age.  All these problems boil down to a deficiency in centralization.  The 
centralization inherent in an established IO command will enable the U.S. military to 
form clear, comprehensive strategy with respect to IO. 
There are some who are opposed to this revolutionary change.  They claim that 
putting all information experts under a single command will effectively minimize and 
limit their ability to create and follow-through with needed IO concepts.  In a way, IO 
techniques will fester within the new command and never flow to operational units.  This 
is a valid concern, but safeguards have been built into the organizational structure 
specifically to prevent this.  The proposed structure here will not allow such stagnation, 
especially in view of the proposed response teams and product development and 
distribution.  Additionally, the organizational support will be provided in a matrix 
manner, driving the provider to balance customer concerns and higher command level’s 
wishes.  Even if stagnation is encountered there are appropriate avenues of feedback in 
place to counter such a standstill, such as the divisional liaisons implemented within the 
IOC.   
As well as having safeguards against a purely inward focus that a large 
bureaucracy can tend to foster, the IOC, by design, has the tentacles necessary to ensure 
IO is used in every aspect of the military.  For instance, were a unified IOC created, each 
regional CINC would have an IO component in the liaison position, i.e., IOCEUR.  Not 
only would this position aid in making the functional IOC responsive to customer needs, 
it also ensures that IO is a viable tool available to the CINC on a day-to-day basis.  By 
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having an everyday presence, which has accesses to a large functional pool of resources, 
the CINC’s ability to utilize IO is greatly enhanced by the daily awareness of IO provided 
by the liaison position and associated staff.  In other words, as opposed to monopolizing 
IO in a self-interested manner, the IOC ensures IO is dispersed throughout the military or 
individual service. 
By utilizing Mintzberg’s ideas, the U.S. military can utilize a centralized 
organizational approach that begins with emphasis at the strategic apex’s formulation of 
strategy.  This centralization does not cancel the opportunity to develop selective 
decentralization when needed, thus allowing for benefits of both centralization and 
decentralization.  An example of this selective decentralization would be the support 
provided to units in the form of tailored packages as depicted in Figure 10.  Feasibly, the 
make up of such tailored packages are in response to a customer’s needs as opposed to 
the IOC’s dictates.  Therefore, as demonstrated, the structure can be organized in a way 
to meet the needs of individual units, but at the same time maintain a centralized theme.   
Most of the goals of a new IO command can be successfully achieved by a mere 
centralized design.  A clearly defined, single entity can provide concise, overall guidance 
for the U.S. military’s approach to IO.  This will allow the military to remain one step 
ahead of its adversaries in IO.  We should not continue our ad hoc approach to 
information dominance, which in turn permits enemies to forge ahead as we continue the 
IO debate.  The U.S. military needs to organize for victory in the information domain and 
it should do so by creating an innovative IO command. 
B. FURTHER RESEARCH 
Due to the constraints of time, there are some areas related to this thesis that were 
not thoroughly researched.  As well, the very nature of academia, the generator of thesis 
requirements, demands that further research will always exist.  In this vein, the below 
areas are some of the areas related to this thesis upon which further research would be 
helpful. 
1. Classified Data 
All of the research accomplished for this thesis was accomplished at the 
unclassified level.  A reasonable argument could be made that to fully explore the diverse 
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areas that an IOC would be responsible for, one must delve into the classified realm.  
Such delving might reveal a more organized effort at implementing IO than what appears 
to be occurring based solely on unclassified information.  Thus, the information in this 
thesis could be enhanced by the contribution of classified information that relates to the 
tactics, techniques, and procedures that currently exist within the IO realm. 
2. Further Integration of Surveillance and Reconnaissance 
Within the organization described in this thesis, the attempt has been made to 
create a strong integration of all the related fields of IO, i.e., intelligence, 
communications, PSYOP, civil affairs, etc.  However, the connection of the proposed 
organization to the areas of surveillance and reconnaissance is weak at best.  In today’s 
military environment these two areas are an integral part of forming and measuring the 
results of an IO plan or campaign.  By increasing the tie between a nominal IOC and 
surveillance and reconnaissance, it would be possible for a single entity to provide 
command and control of such assets.  Were an IOC to be created at the unified command 
level, arguably this command and control could be provided without concerns regarding 
the parochialism of the individual services, as the unified command environment would 
provide the joint flavor necessary for truly joint operations. 
As an example, in the application of the model the liaison officer function was 
implemented by creating theater commands such as IOCEUR.  In order to facilitate the 
coordination of space-based surveillance and reconnaissance assets, it may be necessary 
to create a liaison between the USIOC and SPACECOM, i.e., IOCSPACE.  Regardless, 
within this general area there is additional research that could be accomplished. 
3. Manpower Study 
The devil is in the details and with any major organizational proposals or changes 
one of the devils is manpower.  For the purposes of this thesis, current organizations were 
used to demonstrate the feasibility of implementing the proposed organizational structure.  
Some of the existing organizations were identified as needing enhancement in certain 
areas in order to be fully functionally within a unified IOC.  These enhancements would 
involve robbing some forces, which would necessarily require a manpower study to be 
done.  Therefore, an additional area of needed research is manpower. 
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4. Fiscal Feasibility 
If the first devil in organizational changes in manpower the other devil is money.  
Using existing organizations would hopefully minimize the monetary impact of 
implementing an IOC.  This minimization, however, does not negate the requirement for 
a price tag associated with standing up the organization.  Thus, a study on the fiscal 
feasibility would be an additional area of research regarding this thesis. 
5. Flattening the Hierarchy 
Within the military there is currently much discussion about whether the existing 
command structure can be simplified or flattened.  One of the main drivers of this 
discussion is technology.  The argument is that, based on the military’s advances in 
telecommunications, there is no longer a need for the numerous layers that currently exist 
between the shooter and the top-level commander. 
Assuming there is validity to such argument then an IOC organization would be a 
prime candidate for experimenting with a flatter hierarchy.  The main reason for this 
contention is that technology will be at the core of the IOC, and if technology is the 
enabler for a flatter hierarchy, then the IOC would not need the huge bureaucratic 
command structure that is associated with most of today’s military organizations.  In 
order to determine the validity of this assumption, further research is necessary. 
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